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LOOKING BEYOND THE SUNSET:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE
ACT OF 20021 AND THE ISSUE OF ITS
RENEWAL
“The willingness to take risk is essential
to the growth of a free market economy.” 2
– Alan Greenspan3

I. INTRODUCTION

T

he terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 caused severe
loss of life and property,4 but the economic and legal ramifications of that day continue to plague the United States
(“U.S.”). The U.S. legislation H.3210,5 known as the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”), serves as a perfect exam1. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat.
2322 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)). See also
President Signs Terrorism Insurance Act, The White House website, Nov. 26,
2002, (providing an overview of the Act’s finalization), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/print/200211261.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2004).
2. PETER BERSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
328 (1996) (quoting Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board), quoted in Todd V. McMillan, Securitization and the Catastrophe Bond:
A Transactional Integration of Industries Through a Capacity-Enhancing
Product of Risk Management, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 131, 132 (2001/2002).
3. Alan Greenspan serves as the chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve
Board. When this man speaks, the nation listens, as he is arguably one of the
most knowledgeable individuals in the world of economics and international
finance. For more information on Alan Greenspan, see the Federal Reserve
Board’s Biography website at www.federalreserve.gov/bios/greenspan.htm
(last updated Oct. 3, 2003). See also Greenspan Warns of “Unexpected Events”
as Risk to Markets, AFP, Jan. 13, 2004, at http://www.business.com/search/
rslt_default.asp?r4=t&query=balanced+care+&type=news (last visited Feb. 2,
2004).
4. See September 11: Chronology of Terror, CNN.COM, Sept. 12, 2001, (reporting the time-line for the occurrences of September 11), at http://www/cnn.
com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/index.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
5. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat.
2322 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)).
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ple of such late blooming economic consequences requiring close
legal scrutiny. As of November 15, 2002, this Act requires all
U.S. property insurers to cover terrorist risk in order to protect
the nation from a hesitant insurance industry, which proved
unwilling to bear the future risk of terrorism in light of the
costs of September 11, 2001.6 TRIA presently offers U.S. insurers the financial security necessary for providing terrorism insurance, the only limitation being that the legislation also
comes with an expiration date.7 On December 31, 2005,8 the
U.S. government must again decide what is necessary for the
nation: continued TRIA-provided terrorism reinsurance or deregulation.9
As the U.S. government intends for TRIA to serve as a temporary insurance support mechanism,10 the legislation also
mandates that the U.S. Treasury Department measure the program’s success through reports that indicate the program’s vi-

6. See infra Part II.A.1.
7. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 108(a),
116 Stat. 2322, 2336.
8. Id. However, the Secretary of Treasury still retains the authority to
continue the government insurance’s program for the purposes of taking the
actions “necessary to ensure payment, recoupment, reimbursement, or adjustment of compensation for insured losses arising out of any act of terrorism
occurring during the period in which the Program was in effect….” Id. §
108(b).
9. The Secretary of Treasury will need to report TRIA’s progress to Congress by June 30, 2005. Id. § 108(d)(2). See Jeffrey S. Bragg, Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program, U.S. Treasury Department, at 7 (noting that the U.S.
government plans to evaluate TRIA’s success as a program), at http://www.tr
eas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/pres
s/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2004); Tara Bradshaw, Fact Sheet on Surveys of Terrorism Risk Insurance Markets, Dept. of Treasury Office of Public Affairs, Oct.
23, 2003, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-instituti
on/terrorism-insurance/press/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). See also Steven
Brostoff, Industry Uncertain About TRIA Strategy, NAT. UNDERWRITER, Jan.
29, 2004, available at 2003 WL 69822569 (reporting that the insurance industry is unsure as to whether to seek changes in TRIA or simply to push for
the legislation’s renewal despite its weaknesses).
10. The legislation’s main purpose, as indicated by the statute itself, is “to
establish a temporary Federal program that provides for a transparent system
of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from
acts of terrorism….” Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
297, § 101(b), 116 Stat. 2322, 2323 (emphasis added).
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ability and progress.11 The U.S. government’s Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program (“TRIP”) has already invested in the assistance of the Westat corporation,12 which will provide the federal
government with surveys and economic perspectives for the
government’s insurance program.13 Since the U.S. insurance
and reinsurance industries continue to shy away from fully covering terrorism in their policies,14 the situation’s gravity re-

11. Id. § 108(d)(1–2). See also Mario L. Ugoletti, Implementing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 5–6 (June 12, 2003) (presentation before the
Terrorism Risk Assessment and Insurance Coverage Forum, Westin Grand,
Washington D.C.), at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases (last visited Jan. 15,
2003).
12. Westat, Corp. is a statistical survey research organization that has also
contracted with Marsh, Inc. in order to create questionnaires and contact reference lists. Mark Warshawsky, Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Sept.
15, 2003, at 9 (Presentation of the U.S. Treasury Acting Assistant Secretary
for Economic Policy at the Underwriting Conference, Orlando, FL), at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po1050.htm (last visited Jan 15, 2004).
More information on Westat, Corp. is available at http://www.westat.com/
(last visited Feb. 12, 2004). For more information on March, Inc., visit the
corporation’s website at http://www.marshweb.com/MarshPortal/PortalMain
(last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
13. The U.S. Treasury Department held a meeting on January 30, 2003
with insurance representatives in order to discuss the drafting of survey questionnaires and to select contractor bids for the undertaking. Id.
14. Insurers’ hesitations particularly rest on the issue of potential bankruptcy upon another terrorist attack. Dwight Jaffe & Thomas Russell, Extreme Events and the Market for Terrorism Insurance 4 (Feb. 1, 2002) (U.C.
Berkley paper presented at the Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Conf. on Ins.,
Cambridge, MA) (examining the reaction of markets after the occurrence of
low “frequency/high cost” events”), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.ed
u/jaffee/papers/Jrinsfeb02.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2003). “[T]he probability
that an insurance firm would be made bankrupt by a particularly bad terrorist loss during one year is substantially higher than the probability that the
same firm would be made bankrupt by a particularly bad run of, say, auto
insurance losses during a year.” Id. The insurance industry remains uncomfortable with bearing the entire risk of insuring against terrorism arguably
because of the absence of historical data on the matter. See Christian Gollier,
Insurability 24 (Feb. 1, 2002) (paper prepared for the Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research Conf. on Ins., Cambridge, MA), available at http://www.nber.org
/~confer/2002/insw02/insurprg.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2002). For example,
no one knows the likelihood of a “large terrorist attack next year.” Id. Interestingly enough, however, this ambiguity does not paint the entire picture, as
insurance theorists claim ambiguity alone is not determinative. Id. Gollier
explains that the insurance industry’s aversion to cover terrorist-related harm
exemplifies the “weight of evidence dilemma.” Id. at 24–25. He provides
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quires that the U.S. government quickly determine TRIA’s destiny, even if it means renewing the legislation again on a shortterm basis.15 The legislation’s passage strongly rested on its
temporary nature;16 yet with the continuing terrorist threat, the
legislation may require either a strong alternative or some serious alterations.17 U.S. officials will need to carefully examine
the program’s statistical data as well as other insurance and
national safety considerations before selecting a national terrorism insurance coverage option.
This Note will serve to clarify the legal and economic concerns that surround the forthcoming issue of TRIA’s renewal
through a comparison of the U.S. government’s terrorism insurance program with the parallel programs available in the
United Kingdom (“U.K.”) and Israel. An international perspective brings to light both TRIA’s limitations and achievements.
As this Note will reveal, TRIA still has much room for improvement. These issues can also potentially pose a significant
Keynes-Ellsberg’s “two color problem” in order to illustrate this evidentiary
issue:
[T]here are two urns each containing red and black balls. Urn 1 contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls, whereas urn 2 contains 100 red
balls and black balls in unknown proportion. A ball is drawn at random from an urn and receives 100 euros or nothing depending on the
color of the ball. The fact that people are indifferent to bet on red or
black is used to indicate that their subjective probability for each
color is 0.5, as in urn 1. [One seeking to maximize their probabilities]
should thus be indifferent to using urn 1 or urn 2 for gambling. However, most people prefer to gamble with the unambiguous urn 1,
where the “weight of evidence” is larger.
Id. at 25. The insurability problem arises when insurers are “systematically
more adverse than consumers.” Id. But see John Hillman, Terrorism Insurer:
Americans Forget the Lessons of Sep. 11, BESTWIRE, Dec. 10, 2003, available at
LEXIS, Nexis News & Bus. Library (reporting that the vice president of ACE
USA’s terrorism underwriting department claims that in the event that the
U.S. government does not renew TRIA, ACE will still be able to offer clients
“other type[s] of protection.”).
15. Insurers are also confronting the dilemma of TRIA’s upcoming expiration. See Lee Ann Gjertsen, P/C Outlook: Higher Rates, Consolidation, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 30, 2003, at 1.
16. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 101(b),
116 Stat. 2322, 2323 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp.
2003)).
17. See Michele Heller & Rob Blackwell, Treasury: No Terror-Risk Extension, AM. BANKER, Dec. 16, 2003, at 4.
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cost burden for taxpayers, making room for some improvement
necessary. For this reason, this Note argues in favor of TRIA’s
renewal, but contingent on serious alterations that would make
the legislation more meaningful and helpful to the nation.18
After this introduction, Part II provides background information necessary for understanding the reasoning behind the unavailability of insurance and reinsurance within the U.S. afterSeptember 11, 2001 and also discusses TRIA’s legislative details. Part III introduces the analogous insurance dilemma
faced by the U.K. in England and in Northern Ireland from
1992 until today, explaining the nation’s most recent legal developments as well as the implications of government insurance
assistance for the nation’s insurance industry. Part III also introduces Israeli legal intervention in terrorism insurance coverage, demonstrating widespread public insurance techniques
used for involving the private sector in mandatory national terrorism coverage. Part IV then presents a critical analysis of
TRIA and compares the U.S. government insurance program
with the Note’s proffered international models.19 This comparison then provides a global backdrop for the legislation, allowing
for a critical comparative analysis and policy direction in sup18. See generally Warshawsky, supra note 12.
19. Please note that in the case of the U.K.’s relations with Northern Ireland and Israel’s with respect to Palestine, the right to self-determination
under international law also applies. This Note, however, focuses on the economic aspect of national terrorism insurance programs, as perceived by each
implementing State. For more information on this issue in relation to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, see John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a
Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 171 (1998) (focusing on the Palestinian
right of return as addressed in the Israel/Palestine Liberation Organization
negotiations); Richard Wilner, Nationalist Movements and the Middle East
Peace Process: Exercises in Self-Determination, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
297 (1995) (noting that Palestinians and Israelis have a “common but conflicting” right to self-determination). For an analysis of recent developments in
the U.K. with respect to the right to self-determination in Northern Ireland,
see Colleen J. O’Loughlin, A Peace Process Perspective Northern Ireland and
the Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations Belfast, April 10, 1998,
13 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 91 (2000). See also Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307 (2002).
See, e.g., David Wastell & Valerie Elliot, Focus the Relentless Campaign: The
IRA is the Government Really Going to Change the Rules of Engagement?,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH LONDON, Dec. 20, 1992, available at 1992 WL 9566473
(exemplifying that many consider the IRA’s plights as examples of Irish nationalism).
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port of TRIA’s renewal. Part V concludes with a summary of
the alterations necessary for TRIA’s maximum effectiveness as
a facilitator of terrorism insurance coverage.
II. TRIA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The American Insurance Dilemma — Changes After
September 11th
As a result of the insurance industry’s realization of its immense underestimations of underwriting terrorism due to September 11, 2001,20 insurance contracts renegotiations quickly
crumbled thereafter.21 In fact, although unknown to many,
January 1, 2002 was a monumental day in the history of American insurance coverage. That day set the stage for TRIA’s passage, marking the date when most reinsurance and insurance
companies refused to renegotiate practically all insurance contracts, including terrorism coverage.22
The reinsurance industry’s extensive refusal was devastating
to insurance companies, since reinsurance serves as the prime
insurance of insurers.23 Contractual agreements, also known as
“treaties,”24 between reinsurers and insurers play a monumental
20. See Gordon Woo, Quantifying Insurance Terrorism Risk 1 (Feb. 1,
2002) (paper prepared for the Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Conf. on Ins.,
Cambridge, MA) available at http://www.nber.org/~confer/2002/insw02/in
surprg.html (last visited Oct, 17, 2002). See also Gollier, supra note 14, at 26.
The occurrence of an “underestimated” risk effectively penalizes underwriters
as such losses pose a direct threat to their company’s loss ratios. Id. For this
reason, in such adverse situations, underwriters prefer to “overestimate” their
risks instead. Id.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See Jane Kendall, Comment, The Incalculable Risk: How the World
Trade Center Disaster Accelerated the Evolution of Insurance Terrorism Exclusions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 569, 583 (2002). Insurance terminology refers to
insurance companies that offer reinsurance as “reinsurers,” while insurance
companies that seek the cover of reinsurance benefit are known as the “reinsured” or “ceding” companies. John S. Butler, Legal Nature and Types of Reinsurance, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE COLLECTIONS
AND INSOLVENCY 10 (David M. Spector & John Milligan eds., 1988).
23. See 44A AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 1809 (2003) (Reinsurance — Definitions and Characteristics).
24. Reinsurance treaties usually apply to a large number of insurance policies that reinsurance companies underwrite for long terms on a “continual
basis” with annual or quarterly cancellation provisions, allowing for insurance
companies to include additional policies as long their portfolios meet original

File: IreneMacro.doc

Created on: 2/14/2004 4:41 PM

Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM

2004] TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002

833

role in the viability of the insurance industry.25 Through the
dispersion of market-liability,26 reinsurers provide insurers with
financial protection.27 Reinsurance agreements allow insurance
companies to provide policyholder protection by transferring, or
ceding, a part of the insured risk to a reinsurance company.28
At a later time, reinsurance companies can then choose to reassign their own risk to other investors by “retrocession.”29 For
this reason, the reinsurance industry prevents the insolvency of
insurers by assisting in the apportionment of liability for a particular event.30
agreement conditions and standards.
ROSS PHIFER, REINSURANCE
FUNDAMENTALS: TREATY AND FACULTATIVE 12, 46 (1996).
25. See id. at 6–15; Michael A. Knoerzer, Reinsurance, 690 PLI/LIT 719,
723 (2003) (offering general information on the reinsurance market’s role in
insurance).
26. Insurers find that instead of multiple insurers covering one asset the
most cost effect way to insure large risks, such as bridges and large buildings,
is through one insurer who then can cede their risk to a reinsurer. Knoerzer,
supra note 25, at 743.
27. See id. at 743.
28. No privity exists between the reinsurer and the reinsured, as the ceded
portion creates a relationship that only relates to the ceding insurer and reinsurer. Id. at 721; 44A AM JUR. 2d Insurance §1812 (Reinsurance — Nature of
Reinsurer’s Relationship to Original Policy Holder).
29. See John S. Diaconis, Introductory Comments and Basic Overview in a
Changing Global Environment, 778 PLI/COMM 7, 12 (1998) (explaining fundamental reinsurance terminology). See also Kendall, supra note 22, at 579.
See generally ROBERT RIEGEL ET AL., INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES:
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY (6th ed. 1976).
30. The following example elaborates on how reinsurance provides insurance coverage for assumed risks:
Building B has a value of [$]10 million. It is insured by insurance
companies X and Y, with each insuring fifty percent of the total value
of the building. X and Y reinsure their risks with reinsurers R sub
[to R sub n], respectively, through reinsurance contracts while retaining forty percent of their respective risks for their own accounts. If
the building is destroyed, the [$]10 million loss will no longer be
borne entirely by X and Y. X and Y will have to pay for the loss up
front but, ultimately, their net payout will be limited to [$]2 million
each.
William B. Bice, Comment, British Government Reinsurance and Acts of Terrorism: The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 441, 445 (1993),
incorporating an example from: 1 KLAUS GERATHEWOHL ET AL., REINSURANCE
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 3–6 (John Milligan–Whyte eds., 1988). Note, however, reinsurance treaties for the most part serve as indemnity contracts,
which means that the reinsurer does not make any payments until the ceding
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However, the September 11 attacks pushed the U.S.’ intricate
insurance system to its limit, and led reinsurers to withdraw
from such expansive liability for terrorist damage exposure, as
reinsurers were reportedly liable for 60 to 80% of insurance
payments.31 Reinsurance companies’ new policies and renewal
options excluded terrorism liability and, therefore, severely limited insurers’ terrorism coverage.32 This overt exclusion led
many property owners and developers to scramble to find pricey
alternatives before TRIA’s enactment.33
As a result of high insurance premiums and, in many cases,
lack of coverage offered, nearly half of U.S. businesses had no
terrorism insurance coverage before the legislation’s enactment.34 In fact, the property industry asserted that new building projects estimated at $15 billion35 were stalled due to the
company pays a percentage of the reinsurer’s portion for each claim. See
PHIFER, supra note 24, at 230.
31. Jim Saxton, Economic Perspective on Terrorism Insurance 4 (May
2002) (paper prepared for the Joint Economic Congressional Committee)
available at http://www.house.gov/jec/terrorism/insur.pdf (last visited May 12,
2003).
32. See Kendall, supra note 22, at 581–87.
33. See, e.g., William Sherman, Putting a Premium on Disaster: Insurance
Costs Skyrocketing after Attacks, DAILY NEWS, April 28, 2002, at 22. Several
prominent insurance deals that took place after contract renewal either required much higher premiums or completly excluded terrorist harm: (1) After
October 31, New York’s Metropolitan Transit Authority (“MTA”) faced an
increase in insurance rates from $6 million for $1.5 billion coverage and now
is paying $18 million for $500 million coverage, a 200% increase, and the MTA
also needed to purchase separate coverage for terrorism coverage at a $7.5
million premium for $70 million worth of coverage; (2) San Francisco’s Golden
Gate bridge’s new insurance policy doubled and did not cover terrorism; (3)
Yankee stadium’s insurance premium increased 125%, but the team stated
that it would not increase admission; (4) The Meadowland’s insurance premium significantly increased from $700,000 to $2.1 million; and (5) Co-op and
condominium buildings’ premiums increased 30% to 50%. Id. In addition,
Times Square’s Condé Nast building was found to be in default on its mortgage because of the building’s lack of terrorism insurance, creating a heated
legal dispute between the mortgaging bank and property owners. Thomas J.
Walsh, 4 Times Square Runs Into Terrorism Coverage Problem, May 13, 2002,
at http://www.crnewspage.com/4_times_story.html; Michael Kercheval, A Policy on Terrorism Insurance: Who Will Pay Out if Terrorism Strike Malls?,
CHAIN STORE AGE EXECUTIVE WITH SHOPPING CENTER AGE, May 1, 2002, at 92.
34. See Look, No Umbrella, ECONOMIST, Sep. 7, 2002, at Fin. & Econ. sec.
35. George W. Bush, President Reiterates the Need for Terrorism Insurance Agreement, (Oct. 3, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.white
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lack of terrorism insurance availability.36 As a result, insurance
uncertainty was negatively affecting the U.S. economy.37 Had
the U.S. government refrained from assisting in the reinstatement of terrorism insurance coverage, another terrorist attack
could have easily driven many businesses into bankruptcy, destroyed existing bank loans secured by properties of which the
underlying value would have significantly diminished, limited
future project funding and damaged pension funds as property
investments would fail to reap profitable reimbursements.38
Due to these devastating prospects, TRIA presently provides
governmental support to the insurance industry as a reinsurer
of “last resort.”39
The primary burden of covering the costs of the attacks was
carried by insurance and reinsurance companies under “all
risk”40 insurance coverage for businesses and property owners in
house.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/200210003-6.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2002)). But see Look, No Umbrella, supra note 34, (pointing to a total sum of
$8 million).
36. See Adjustments to the NIPA’s for the Impact of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks, 2001: Third Quarter, Survey of Current Business, Bureau of
Econ. Analysis (Nov. 2001).
37. Id.
38. For this reason, secured lenders and insurance company/relationship
lenders took various approaches in handling the issue of terrorism insurance.
Richard R. Goldberg, Real Estate Financing Documentation: Coping with the
New Realities, SH004 ALI-ABA 537, 549 (2003). Securitized lenders required
terrorism insurance coverage on new loans and also demanded similar insurance on existing loans and projects. Id. at 549. In contrast, insurance company and relationship lenders allowed for terrorism insurance waivers, but
some of these companies waived the procurement of terrorism insurance until
it was commercially available to other similarly situated property owners. Id.
Cf. Bice, supra note 30, at 448 (noting the implication of lack of terrorism
coverage in the case of the U.K.).
39. Cf. Paul Durman, Government Shares Bomb Insurance, INDEPENDENT,
Dec. 22, 1992, at 1 (referring to the U.K.’s terrorism insurance scheme as one
where the government serves as the “reinsurer of last resort”).
40. See HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d § 1.10. The standard definition of “all risk” insurance coverage is as follows:
[A]ll risk coverage should be interpreted to be just that — “All Risks.”
Once the loss is proven by the insured to be caused by some risk generally covered…other than normal depreciation or inherent vice or
defect, the insurer should have the burden to prove that the loss does
not fall within some specified exclusion or exception. That the insurer has the burden of proof to prove no coverage under an all risk
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the downtown World Trade Center area.41 According to the insurance industry, insurance payouts for the attacks have
marked the steepest financial burden for the U.S. insurance
industry since Hurricane Andrew42 as well as the largest insurance catastrophe ever worldwide.43 Although the primary insurance industry could possibly have sidestepped the costs of
the September 11 attacks through a “war exclusion” clause
found in most “all risk” policies, the insurance industry refrained from using this legal backdoor.44
policy is the American rule in all the states, with the possible exception of Texas.
Id. See also Joseph P. Snyder & Susan A. McAllister, Risk Management;
Keeping Abreast of Insurance Policies: Review of Available Property/Liability
Coverages, 14 COMM. LEASING L. & S. 3 (2001). The insurance industry provides a multitude of coverage options that are slowly eroding the past popular
“all risk” insurance coverage. Id. Snyder and McAllister elaborate this point:
Property insurance coverage…protects the owner of property and
others who have insurable interest in the property against loss due to
fire and other perils. There are two general types of property insurance coverage: (1) “Named Perils” coverage, which clearly identifies
the specific risks or perils insured against…, and (2) “Special Form”
coverage, which covers all direct physical loss or damage to the insured unless it is caused by a peril specifically excluded from coverage under the terms of the policy. Special form coverage is by far the
most common type of coverage purchased. It is the successor to “All
Risk” insurance and is more expansive than its predecessor because
it more specifically limits the occurrences excluded from coverage.
Though many leases still require “All Risk” coverage, it has disappeared from the titles of insurance companies.
Id. For a list of items typically excluded in U.K. “all risk” insurance contracts,
see DIGBY C. JESS, THE INSURABILITY OF COMMERCIAL RISK: LAW AND PRACTICE,
316–17 (Sweet & Maxwell 3rd ed. 2001).
41. However, the World Trade Center’s insurance coverage may have actually been higher than the national average due to the building’s previous experience from the 1993 attack.
42. In 1992, Hurricane Andrews reportedly created damage that cost insurers $15.5 billion in losses. The Ten Most Costly Catastrophes, United
States, 1989–1999, reported in THE FACT BOOK 2001, 93 (Insurance Information Institute 2001).
43. See Jeffery W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11:
Myriad Claims, Multiple lines, Arguments Over Occurrence Counting, War
Risk Exclusions, the Future of Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues of Government Role, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 817 (2002); Jeffrey E. Thomas, Exclusion of
Terrorist Related Harms From Insurance Coverage: Do The Costs Justify the
Means?, 36 IND. L. REV. 397, 399 (2003).
44. See Stempel, supra note 43, at 817.
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War exclusion clauses specify that insurance companies
should not have to pay for the costs of damages inflicted by an
enemy state.45 For example, in Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety,46 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ruled that Aetna did not have recourse to the
war exclusion clause in the aftermath of the Pan American
commercial airplane hijacking.47 In this case, terrorists had
forced a plane to land in Egypt in order to use the threat of
harm as a bargaining tool for their cause, which ultimately led
to the plane’s destruction. The Court reasoned that war can
exist between “quasi-sovereign entities”48 and can also “exist
between sovereign states,”49 but insisted that the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine’s (“PFLP”) actions were independent from other Palestinian entities and, therefore, unrelated to any type of sovereign’s act of war.50
Despite this legal precedent, insurance companies could have
made the claim that the September 11 events were acts of war
in light of President Bush’s declaration to that effect and subsequent U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan. The insurance
industry could have also pointed to the strong ties between the
Taliban and Al Qaeda.51 Nevertheless, after carefully consider45. See generally Kendall, supra note 22, at 573 (explaining the history of
war exclusion clauses).
46. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 505
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Holiday Inn, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance, 571 F.
Supp. 1460, 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that: “It is not sufficient [for a terrorist group] to achieve [state] status [when] that … group or entity in question occupy territory within the boundary of the sovereign state upon the consent of that state’s de jure government.”). But see Wilker Bros. Co. v. Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co., 529 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (excluding
loss from coverage for a mob looting of a manufacturing plant in Nicaragua
during the nation’s civil war). For a thorough analysis of the case law regarding war exclusion clauses in insurance contracts, see John W. Stamper, Looking at the Events of September 11: Some Effects and Implications, 69 DEF.
COUNS. J. 152 (2002).
47. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 505
F.2d at 1009. See also Sunny South Aircraft Service, Inc. v. American Fire &
Casualty Co., 140 So. 2d 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), aff’d, 51 So. 2d 276 (Fla.
1973).
48. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 505
F.2d at 1009.
49. Id. at 1013.
50. Id.
51. See Stamper, supra note 46, at 152.
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ing the public relations and cost ramifications of such action
and the court’s probable leniency towards insured parties,52 the
insurance industry chose not to pursue any possible “war exclusion” argument.53
Before September 11, underwriters freely assumed the risk of
terrorism under “all risk” insurance policies.54 At that time, insurers considered the chances of domestic terrorist attacks on
the U.S. as reasonably miniscule in comparison to other insurance coverage costs.55 The costs of the September 11 World
Trade Center attacks, however, were far from miniscule. The
tragedy of September 11 cost insurers an estimated $100 billion.56 Although the insurance industry was able to pay for most
of the damages, another terrorist catastrophe would, according
to the industry, deplete their financial reserves and force many
insurers into bankruptcy, potentially devastating the U.S. insurance business.57 In the case of the World Trade Center disaster, the insurance industry had not anticipated such major
losses due to terrorism and this lack of foresight forced insurers
and reinsurers to assume a substantial portion of the damages
of September 11.58
52. See Westchester Resco Co. v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 818
F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that insurance policy ambiguities are “construed
strictly against” the insurer). See also Thomas, supra note 43, at 420–23 (explaining the transaction costs associated with litigating terrorism exclusion
from insurance and reinsurance coverage).
53. See Stempel, supra note 43, at 817.
54. See Thomas, supra note 43, at 402.
55. See RICHARD J. HILLMAN, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TERRORISM INSURANCE: ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS FOR PROTECTING INSURANCE
CONSUMERS 1 (2001) (Testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial
Services House of Representatives).
56. Gregg J. Loubier & Jason B. Aro, Insuring the Risk of Terror: Questions
of the Costs and Application of Terror Insurance Remains Open, 25 AUG. L.A.
L. 18 (2002).
57. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) noted
that even a $25 million loss for a primary insurance property/casualty insurer
would pose solvency issues for 886 companies, which represents 44% of companies providing for such insurance. Thomas, supra note 43, at 403.
58. See World Trade Center Attack — The Ramifications, Tyser Group
Limited, (explaining and listing the monetary losses that insurance companies
faced world wide due to the September 11 attacks), at http://www.tyseruk.
co.uk/wtc.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2004). In fact, the World Trade Center’s
bombing also changed the lender’s insurance requirements at closing, as one
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In order to prevent this exorbitant cost exposure, reinsurers
redrafted their insurance treaties to exclude terrorism. Primary insurers and reinsurers’ agreements involve a high level
of contract negotiability, which allows for such reinsurance exclusions.59 Insurers and reinsurers draft sophisticated negotiation with regard to treaties as compared to the standard boilerplate policies that primary insurers provide to insured parties.60
The distinction poses significant legal implications. The inherent flexibility of treaties allows each party to include or exclude
terms through negotiation.61 Moreover, reinsurance treaties
usually maintain provisions requiring dispute resolution
through private arbitration, which further limits judicial intervention.62 This freedom of contract limited the U.S. courts’ and
government’s intervention in such insurance matters.63
of the hotly litigated issues with respect to insurance coverage for the damages were the existence of the actual insurance policies themselves. Goldberg,
supra note 38, at 548. The billion-dollar World Trade Center transaction was
closed through the use of insurance binders placed with multiple carriers. Id.
The use of these insurance binders or ACORD 27 certificates meant that insurance policies were never issued; nevertheless, the court used these binders
in order to construe an applicable insurance policy. Id.
59. See James A. Johnson, Gentlemen’s Agreement, 81 MICH. B.J. 20, 23
(2002) (providing background information on reinsurance practice).
60. See also ROBERT MERKIN ED., WHAT IS REINSURANCE? A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 2, 51 (AIDA Reinsurance Working Party, 1998).
61. See id.
62. See LAW OF REINSURANCE § 21:1 (1993); MERKIN, supra note 60, at 51.
However, the reinsurance markets globalization has increased the amount of
litigation involving claim disputes. Id. at 2. See also Jonathan F. Bank &
Patricia Winters, Reinsurance Arbitration: A U.S. Perspective, in LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE COLLECTIONS AND INSOLVENCY 554–
86 (David M. Spector & John Milligan eds., 1988) (providing a historical overview and analysis of U.S. reinsurance arbitration); Richard G. Waterman,
Reinsurance Arbitration: A Process in Transition, 854 PLI/COMM 477 (2003);
Michael C. Zeller, Procedures for the Resolution of U.S. Insurance and Reinsurance Disputes, 854 PLI/COMM 487 (2003). For a general introduction to
international arbitration, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION — CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1997).
63. See Kendall, supra note 22, at 584 (“Whereas state regulatory agencies
exercise veto power over the specific terms of insurance policies intended for
issuance to consumers by direct writers, they exercise little power over the
terms of reinsurance treaties as a matter of longstanding practice.”). However, reinsurers still face regulation through their ceding companies, since
state law limits the “ceding company’s ability to take credit on its statutory
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Due to the cessation of contractual obligations after January
1, 2002, many reinsurers were free to abstain from providing
terrorism insurance coverage and this was the option that most
insurers chose to take.64 The few reinsurance companies that
did provide such insurance post January 1, 2002 nearly doubled
their premium rates while simultaneously decreasing their total coverage.65 As a result, the insurance industry was left on a
tightrope without the assumed safety net of reinsurance. Despite this, however, the primary insurance industry needed to
satisfy state regulation standards.66 Thus, in part, the lack of
legal intervention forced the insurance industry to consider the
discontinuation of terrorism related insurance.
1. The State-Level Domino Effect of Insurance Deregulation
As most reinsurance companies dropped terrorism coverage,
the insurance industry struggled to provide terrorism policies
for their clients. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”)67 asked for each state to allow for the Insurance Services Office’s (“ISO”)68 exclusion modifications,
which would exclude losses stemming from less costly acts of

financial statement for the reinsurance” coverage if a reinsurer is not licensed
to transact business in the state. Anthony B. Sherman, United States — General Framework and Conduct of Business, in THE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL’S GUIDE
TO INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE 2003, 89 (Rob Mannix et al. eds., 2003).
64. As reinsurers conduct business on an international scale with sophisticated insurance companies, reinsurers face limited government regulation.
See Thomas, supra note 43, at 403. For this reason, reinsurers were easily
able to subtract terrorism insurance coverage from their treaty negotiations
with insurers. See id.
65. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
66. See infra Part II.A.1.
67. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) serves
as an insurance regulation organization, representing all fifty states, the District of Columbia and the four U.S. territories. The NAIC provides a forum for
uniform insurance policy development and assists state regulators in protecting the interests of insurance consumers for the provision of common financial
objectives and conduct regulation. For more information, see the NAIC’s website at http://www.naic.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
68. For more information on the Insurance Services Office’s (“ISO”) most
current stance on terrorism insurance, see the ISO’s website at http://www.is
o.com/filings/response.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). The ISO’s website also
provides forms and policy writing rules in response to TRIA’s requirements.
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terrorism.69 The ISO supplies hundreds of U.S. insurance companies with advice and standard forms of insurance policy provisions,70 and established licensed forms for terrorism exclusions.71 The ISO’s exclusionary clauses limited insurance companies’ exposure to a maximum of $25 million72 within a seventy-two hour time frame, or for the death of fifty or more people; furthermore, the threshold amount did not include terrorist
activity using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.73 Thus,
terrorism coverage excluded properties and development projects requiring coverage greater than proscribed, especially trophy buildings and national landmarks.74
While most states allowed for insurance deregulation, several
prominent states such as New York, California, Texas, Georgia
and Florida withheld approval.75 New York and California ardently opposed the ISO’s exclusionary clause.76 California re69. See S. Roy Woodall, Jr., Terrorism Insurance — The 2002 Market Place,
CRS REPORT RS21106, at 3–4, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/sec
urity/library/report/crs/RS21075.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
70. For more information, see the ISO’s website at http://www.iso.com (last
visited Jan. 5, 2004).
71. Terrorism, as defined by the ISO, consisted of:
Activities against persons, organizations or property of any nature:
(1) That involve the following or preparation of the following: (a) Use
or threat of force or violence; or (b) Commission or threat of a dangerous act; or (c) Commission or threat of an act that interferes with or
disrupts an electronic, communication, information, or mechanical
system; and (2) When one or both of the following applies: (a) The effect is to intimidate or coerce a government or the civilian population
or any segment thereof, or to disrupt any segment of the economy; or
(b) It appears that the intent is to intimidate of coerce a government,
or to further a political, ideological, religious, social or economic objectives or to express (or express opposition to) a philosophy or ideology.
ISO Properties, Inc., Exclusion of Terrorism (with Limited Exception) and
Exclusion of War and Military Action, (2001), at 1–2.
72. The adoption of the $25 million limit stemmed from insurers’ concerns
that any higher amount would create a severe threat to the solvency of a substantial percentage of insurers of property and casualty insurance. See Thomas, supra note 43, at 404.
73. States Adopt Terror Exclusion Clauses in Absence of Any Federal Solution, INS. DAY, Mar. 5, 2002, at law sec. [hereinafter States Adopt Terror Exclusion Clauses].
74. See Look, No Umbrella, supra note 34.
75. Loubier & Aro, supra note 56, at 19.
76. MERKIN, supra note 60.
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fused to accept the ISO’s terrorism exclusion since the state’s
regulators found: the ISO’s definition of terrorism to be too
broad; the $25 million threshold of national damage overwhelmingly low; and the seventy-two hour time period as plainly arbitrary.77 New York state regulators voiced similar grievances
with the ISO’s exclusion clause, and further noted that the $25
million threshold would exclude practically every building in
downtown Manhattan, especially buildings near the World
Trade Center site.78
Since insurance regulation primarily falls under state law,79
insurers who wished to follow the exception clause started writing property insurance policies through affiliated companies
conducting business within insurance-friendly states.80 Despite
a limited amount of insurers,81 who established their own terrorism insurance coverage in separate policies, terrorism insurance remained extremely expensive and scarce.82 Meanwhile,
the insurance industry also significantly increased commercial
property insurance premiums in order to assist covering September 11 costs.83 As the insurance industry limited its in-

77. States Adopt Terror Exclusion Clauses, supra note 73.
78. Id.
79. McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2000). For an overview of insurance rate regulation, see SCOTT E. HARRINGTON, INSURANCE
DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Washington, D.C. 2000).
80. Loubier & Aro, supra note 56, at 19.
81. According to one source, five carriers offered terrorism insurance coverage with limits of $200 million, charging premiums that “far outweighed the
costs of regular casualty insurance.” Richard R. Goldberg, Real Estate Financing Documentation: Coping with New Realities, SH004 ALI–ABA 537,
548 (2003). The list of such insurers was extremely limited, and included the
following insurers: Lloyd’s, AIG and ACE. See Look, No Umbrella, supra note
34.
82. Look, No Umbrella, supra note 34.
83. Bob Howard, Commercial Real Estate; Tenants to Pay Increased Rents
in 2002. See also Insurance: Fees for Commercial Property Will Jump, as
Landlords Face Premiums Hikes of 30% to 100%, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 25,
2001, at 5 (This article indicates that the insurance industry hiked up premiums also due to years of under-pricing and a general decline in the equity
market, which stemmed from insurance companies’ previous practice of investing premiums into the stock market for a profit that would in turn minimize premiums.).
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volvement in insurance claims arising from terrorist acts, the
nation turned to the U.S. government for a solution.84
B. U.S. Congressional Action: A Myriad of Changes Before
TRIA’s Enactment
Due to the lack of insurance for properties and major building
projects, the U.S. government moved to support the insurance
industry in Congress’ first and second sessions. After countless
deliberations, the legislature enacted the “Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,”85 which many now refer to as TRIA. The
main difficulty in passing the bill was merging the House of
Representatives’ plan, H.R. 321086 (the Terrorism Risk Protection Act), with the Senate’s plan, S. 260087 (the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002), in order to establish TRIA. Both plans
entailed the federal government’s monetary support only after
the insurance industry’s costs of terrorist-instigated damages
exceeded an established monetary threshold; however, each
house differed in terms of deductible amounts, government assumption of risk, limits on punitive damages and repayment
arrangements.88 The final version of the bill incorporated bits
and pieces of both houses’ legislative plans. For this reason, an
understanding of the final product requires some attention to
the deliberation proceedings, since the Act provides no explanations or legislative history.
The House’s “Terrorism Risk Protection Act” structured a reinsurance scheme that would provide insurers a way to spread
their losses after a catastrophic terrorist attack in a manner
very different from the enacted legislation.89 Under the House’s
plan, the federal government would assume 90% of the insur84. See Adjustments to the NIPA’s for the Impact of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks, 2001: Third Quarter, Survey of Current Business, Bureau of
Econ. Analysis, (Nov. 2001); Claire Wilkinson, United States — Uninsured
Terror Risks Set to Rise, Congress Warned, LLOYD’S LIST, Mar. 1, 2002, at 6.
85. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat.
2322 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)).
86. Terrorism Risk Protection Act, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong., 1st Sess.,
(2001).
87. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, S. 2600, 107th Cong., 2d Sess.,
(2002).
88. CBO STUDY, Federal Reinsurance for Disasters, Sept. 2002, at 25–26,
available at http://www.cbo.gov (last visited May 13, 2003).
89. See H.R. 3210 § 2.
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ance industry’s losses when such losses amounted to over $1
billion within a year of the terrorist activity.90 The House’s plan
also provided assistance for smaller insurance claims, if such
claims threatened the solvency of a participating smaller insurer.91 For example, the government could intervene even
when an insurance claim for losses caused by terrorism exceeded 10% of an effected insurance company’s surplus capital
and net premiums.92 Therefore, a claim as relatively small as
$100 million, under the House’s plan, may have merited government support.93
Despite the House’s seeming cornucopia of reinsurance coverage, insurance companies would eventually have to repay the
government for a large part of the financial assistance received.94 For losses under $20 million, insurers would have been
liable to the government for three-quarters of the total amount
the government paid.95 Within the first year, insurers would
have been responsible for one-quarter of the repayment due.96
Under the House’s plan, insurers would have to reimburse the
government’s financial assistance after an unstated number of
years at a rate set at insurers’ annual assessments, not exceeding 3% of their premiums.97 For claims over $20 million and
under the budgetary cut off of $100 billion, policyholders’ premiums would have faced governmental surcharges of up to 3%
of their premiums,98 but the government would not have required insurers to pay interest.99
Alternately, the Senate’s reinsurance plan offered terrorism
insurance coverage without requiring insurance companies to
90. Elaine S. Povich, House OKs Insurance Bill; Measure Would Allow
Coverage Against Terrorist Acts, NEWSDAY (NY), Nov. 30, 2001, at A65 (noting
that the White House endorsed the House’s plan, but prefers the Senate’s
legislation).
91. CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 25.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See H.R. 3210 § 5–7.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 25.
98. Id. See Paul Teller, H.R. — Terrorism Risk Protection Act (Oxley),
Republican Study Committee Legislative Bulletin, available at http://www.
house.gov/bulletin/RSC/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2001).
99. H.R. 3210 § 8(c).
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reimburse the government, similar to the law’s final version.
After a series of unsuccessful House bills,100 the Senate enacted
its own version of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.101 The
Senate’s reinsurance initiative provided insurance funding
without repayment, but only after the insurance industry first
paid a certain deductible.102 Under the Senate’s plan, if a catastrophic event were to occur within the first year103 of the program’s implementation, the insurance industry would have
been liable for the initial $10 billion in losses.104
After the insurance industry had paid the $10 billion, the
government would pay for 80% of all losses up to the maximum
of $100 billion.105 Similar to the House’s strategy, the Senate’s
bill allowed for government assistance for losses under $10 billion only when the solvency of an individual insurance firm was
at stake.106 The deductible would have been the insurer’s market share percentage multiplied by the government’s $10 billion
requirement.107 In this way, the Senate hoped to allow the federal government to assume terrorism risk funding only after the
insurance industry had already assumed their initial responsibility to make payments after the occurrence of a terrorist act.
Regardless of the drastic differences between the House and
Senate’s legislation, Congressional debates mainly involved dis-

100. The following bills were unsuccessful in the first session of the Senate’s
107th Congress: S. 1743, S.1744, S. 1748, and S. 1751.
101. See S. 2600.
102. See id. §§ 3(7) & 4(e).
103. If the treasury decided to extend the program for more than one year,
then insurers would be responsible to pay a deductible of $15 billion in initial
losses.
104. See S. 2600 § 4(e)(II).
105. See id. § 4(e)(I)(A).
106. See id. § 3(7)(A–B).
107. According to the Senate’s Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, an
insurer’s market share would have been:
[C]alculated using the total amount of direct written property and
casualty insurance premiums for the participating insurance company during the 2-year period preceding the year in which the subject
act of terrorism (or during such other period for which adequate data
are available, as determined by the Secretary [of the Treasury]), as a
percentage of the aggregate of all such property an casualty insurance premiums industry-wide during that period.
Id. § 3(4)(A).
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agreement on tort reform.108 Although both Houses agreed that
terrorism insurance assistance would require state preemption,109 and that the Secretary of the Treasury should be appointed as final adjudicator of insurance claims,110 the House’s
bill also added prohibitions against claims seeking punitive
damages, limited cases to federal courts, and sought to cap attorneys’ fees at 20% of awarded damages with penalties for disobedience.111 However, the Senate refused to pass legislation
minimizing the legal rights of litigants and their attorneys,112
leading to a bipartisan debate that lasted the entire second session of Congress, and that went unresolved, ultimately leaving
these sections out of the bill.113 Interestingly enough, the issue
of whether the U.S. government should assist in terrorism insurance coverage rested heavily upon attorneys’ fees.
C. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”)
TRIA ended all debates with important concessions made by
both Houses. The legislation now offers a version of insurance
financial backing similar to the Senate’s bill, for a temporary
three-year span.114 TRIA specifically mandates that all property
insurance companies must cover terrorism risk coverage,115 ex108. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 56, at 21.
109. H.R. 3210 § 12; S. 2600 § 10.
110. H.R. 3210 § 3; S. 2600 § 4(a)(2).
111. H.R. 3210 § 15(a)(7) (included in the Nov. 29, 2001 and Dec. 3, 2001
versions of the bill).
112. In fact, many senators opposed the passage of such legislation, since
many felt that the government’s contemplated reinsurance scheme and litigation reform would in effect act as a “sop to corporate America.” Povich, supra
note 90.
113. See id; CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 25 (noting that the House and
Senate differed on the matter of punitive damages).
114. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §§ 108(a),
102 (11)(D).
115. TRIA requires that all insurance companies that fall under the Act’s
provision must participate. See id. §§ 102(6), 103(a)(3). TRIA defines “insurer” to include: (1) any insurance entity licensed to conduct business in any
state in the U.S.; (2) all eligible insurers under the NAIC’s listing of Alien
Insurers; (3) federally approved insurers providing coverage for maritime,
energy or aviation activity; (4) state residual market insurance entities or
state workers’ compensation funds; and (5) any other entity that fall under
section 103(f) of TRIA, which requires that an entity wishing inclusion in
TRIA must apply before the occurrence of a terrorist act. Id.
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cluding reinsurance,116 making all terrorism exclusions previously approved by various state commissions now void.117
Legislative constraints have also created many compromises
between the two extremes taken by the House and the Senate.
TRIA permits suits for punitive damages, but excludes the government from suit, thus freeing the nation from potential liability.118 There is no language referring to attorneys’ fees and noneconomic damages;119 however, the law limits suits for damages
arising from terrorist attacks to a Congressionally designated
federal court.120 This jurisdictional distinction might very well
produce smaller awards in damages than pro-litigant state
courts.121 However, the merging of pending legislation regarding
116. Id. § 108(a–b).
117. Id. §§ 102(6)(A–C), 105(a–c). Lorelie S. Masters et al., Overview of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, 686 PLI/LIT 427 (2003). TRIA does not obligate
reinsurers to provide insurance for terrorism related harm, as the U.S. government under the Act takes on this role. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §§ 102(6)(A–C), 105(a–c). Section 105 simply
states that: “Any terrorism exclusion in a contract for property and casualty
insurance that is in force on the date of enactment of this Act shall be void to
the extent that it excludes losses that otherwise be insured losses.” Id. §
105(a–c) (emphasis added). However, the amount of coverage that TRIA provides for the general public is questionable, as TRIA requires the availability
of terrorism insurance coverage; it does not specify how much it should cost.
See Thomas, supra note 43, at 404. Accordingly, terrorism insurance coverage
remains expensive for most businesses, which means that insurers are not
insuring terrorism in all of their property and casualty policies. Id. Furthermore, the U.S. Treasury Department explains in an interim guideline that
TRIA requires that insurers make terrorism insurance “available,” but the Act
does not require that insurers cover all risks that relate to terrorism damage,
such as nuclear, biological and chemical damages. Masters, supra note 117,
at 430–31. Furthermore, TRIA also has a provision that allows insurers to
add their previous terrorism exclusions in their contracts after providing their
insured notices of such or if the policy holder does not pay for the additional
terrorism coverage. Id. See also Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107–297, § 105(c). For additional analysis of the ramifications of these
provisions, see infra Part IV.
118. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
107(a)(5).
119. See id. § 107.
120. Id. § 107(a)(4).
121. See generally RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN
APPROACH (West Group 3d ed. 2000). This jurisdictional limitation may also
make it difficult for foreign individuals and companies to prosecute claims
outside of the U.S. Aon Reed Stenhouse Corp., The U.S. Federal Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 Implications for Canadian Insureds, AON STATUS
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frozen terrorist assets ameliorates TRIA’s escape-valve with
respect to punitive damages,122 although it remains questionable
whether or not such a provision will have force.123
The government’s terrorism insurance assistance scheme allows the Secretary of the Treasury to determine and provide
insurance-loss coverage, up to $100 billion for commercial property and casualty insurers’ liabilities resulting from future terrorist attacks,124 excluding traditional acts of warfare.125 Only
the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of State and Attorney
General can determine whether a situation falls under the
category of a terrorist attack,126 their determination being final
without the option of judicial review.127
Government assistance under TRIA covers insurance losses
exceeding the amount of $5 million.128 At that point, insurers
REPORT, Dec. 6, 2002, at 4 (noting that since there are fifty states, there may
very well be fifty different regulatory interpretations of terrorism insurance
coverage) [hereinafter Aon Report].
122. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 107(a)(5)
(“Nothing in this section shall in any way limit the liability of any government, an organization, or person who knowingly participates in, conspires to
commit, aids and abets, or commits any act of terrorism….”).
123. See id. at § 201 (“Satisfaction of judgments from blocked assets of terrorists, terrorist organizations, and State sponsors of terrorism.”). See, e.g.,
Smith ex rel. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217,
226. See also Decision of Interest; United States District Court, Southern New
York, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 2003, at 24; Martin Flumenbaum et al., Second Circuit Review, Recovering Frozen Terrorist Assets; Attorney Work Product, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 2, 2003, at 3. See also Marshal S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims
of Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudence of Injury, 36 IND. L. REV. 237 (2003);
Deborah M. Mostaghel, Wrong Place, Wrong Time, Unfair Treatment? Aid to
Victims of Terrorist Attacks, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 83 (2001).
124. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
103(e)(2)(A)(i). For the Senate and House versions of this provision before the
TRIA’s enactment, see S. 2600 § 4; H.R. 3210 §§ 3, 6(c). See also Paul Teller,
supra note 98.
125. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
102(1)(B)(i). See also S. 2600 § 3(1)(B)(i); H.R. 3210 § 19(1)(B)(v).
126. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 102
(1)(A).
127. Id. § 102 (1)(C).
128. Id. § 102(1)(B)(ii). The $5 million threshold applies to the aggregate
property and casualty insurance losses stemming from an act of terrorism,
and not on a policy-by-policy basis. Ugoletti, Implementing TRIA, supra note
11, at 4. Ugoletti also provides the following illustrative example: “if $7 million in aggregate property and casualty losses from a certified act of terrorism
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remain responsible for a deductible that is adjusted according to
each year’s percentile incremental deductible increase.129 TRIA
assesses insurers’ deductible as an amount equal to the value of
insurers’ direct earned premiums over the calendar year multiplied by 7, 10 and 15% for each year the program progresses.130
Section 103(e)(6)(A–C) also requires insurance companies to
hold aggregate retention amounts of $10 billion, $12.5 billion
and $15 billion.131 Therefore, the federal government’s total possible exposure would be $90 billion for the first year, $87.5 billion for the second year and $85 billion for the program’s last
year.132
TRIA also sets requirements for insurance companies that
were not previously established in either House’s proposed bills.
It places a statutory limit on premium increases to a maximum
of 3% of the premium charged for property and casualty insurance coverage under each policy.133 The legislation also requires
that insurers send coverage notices to their insured stating the
premium charged for claims that TRIA covers.134 This requirement attempts to serve as a mechanism for assisting property
owners in deciding whether or not to purchase terrorism insurance in addition to their regular property and casualty insurance.135 TRIA, however, retains state commission’s regulatory
authority over insurance companies,136 and signifies that conwere distributed among 10 policy holders, those losses could contribute to an
insurance compan[y’s] ability to access the TRIA backstop….” Id.
129. See id. § 102(7)(A–E). “Exposure…equals to the insurer’s deductible
and 10% of insured losses in excess of the deductible. If an insurer had $200
million in direct earned premiums in 2002, its [2003] deductible…would be
equal to $14 million, and 10[%] loss sharing would kick in above $14 million in
insured losses.” Warshawsky, supra note 12, at 5.
130. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
102(7)(A–E).
131. See id. § 103(e)(6)(A–C). See also Warshawsky, supra note 12, at 4.
132. Morgan O’ Rourke, Senate Passes Terrorism Insurance Bill, RISK
MGMT. MAG., Nov. 2002, at 20.
133. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
103(e)(8)(C).
134. Id. § 103(b)(2).
135. See NAIC Model Bulletin, at 7 (providing insurers with some assistance in complying with the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002), at
http://www.naic.org/pressroom/releases/EmergencyResponse.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2004). See also Masters, supra note 117, at 431.
136. Masters, supra note 117, at 427.
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sumer waivers of terrorism insurance will not apply to states
that have legislation requiring insurers to include standard fire
provisions in their policies.137
In addition, TRIA requires insurers to repay the difference
between their marketplace aggregate retention and the aggregate amount that the federal government is not compensated
for because of the amount being within insurers’ deductibles or
within the portion that the government does not cover.138 However, this reimbursable amount can potentially have a diminished value, as the statute further provides that if the uncompensated losses exceed insurers’ aggregate retention, insurers
are absolved of their recoupment requirement and in certain
cases the Secretary of the Treasury has discretion to release
insurers of their duty to reimburse the government.139
Under TRIA, the Secretary of the Treasury has “sole discretion” over claim determinations, with no opportunity for judicial
review.140 In fact, TRIA also bestows upon the Secretary of the
Treasury complete power to carryout the government’s insurance program, including investigating and auditing claims, establishing rules for filing claims, employing personnel and contracting the government’s insurance program to other agencies.141
Because of the U.S. Treasury Department’s role, TRIA now
stands as the U.S.’ current legal mechanism for terrorism insurance coverage. However, as several Congressional reports
137. See NAIC Model Bulletin, supra note 135, at 7. Id. at 431.
138. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
103(e)(7)(A). TRIA explains the recoupment of insurers’ “federal share” as
follows:
[T]he mandatory recoupment amount…shall be the difference between — (i) the insurance marketplace aggregate retention amount…; and (ii) the aggregate amount, of all insurers, of insured losses during the during such period that
are not compensated by the Federal Government because
such losses — (I) are within the insurer deductible for the
insurer subject to the losses; or (II) are within the portion of
losses of the insurer that exceed the insurer deductible, but
are not compensated pursuant to paragraph (1).
Id. See also id § 103(e)(1) (Paragraph (1) explains the government’s “federal
share.”).
139. Id. §§ 103(e)(7)(D), 103(e)(1).
140. See id. § 102(1)(C).
141. Id. § 104(a–d).
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have stressed the need for international templates concerning
government-established terrorism insurance,142 other international examples of government implemented terrorism insurance procedures offer insight into conceivable national expectations and differences. In a world where war has shifted from
national intervention to terrorist action, the realities of terrorism and its threat to a nation’s security and economy constitute
an issue of international magnitude.143 The U.K. has dealt with
terrorist activity in major British metropolitan areas and in
Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, Israel’s ability to function as an
economically viable state depends on its ability to withstand
frequent terrorist activity. The next section serves as a window
on these parts of the world that have faced similar insurance
challenges and have reached legal solutions of their own.144

III. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INSURANCE PERSPECTIVES
“Men walk almost always in the paths trodden by others, proceeding in their actions by imitation….so that if he does
not attain to their greatness, at any rate
he will get some tinge of it.”145
– Niccolo Machiavelli146
A. The U.K.’s Insurance Assistance Scheme: Has History Repeated Itself?
1. The U.K.’s Private/Public Terrorist Insurance Combination
Similar to the U.S.’ current reinsurance crisis, the U.K. faced
an insurance industry unwilling to assume the risks of terrorism in the early 1990’s.147 The U.K.’s insurance industry re142. See Lee Barnes, A Closer Look at Britain’s Pool Re, RISK MGMT. MAG.,
May 2002, at 21.
143. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
101(a)(1).
144. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
145. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 19–20 (Luigi
Ricci trans., Modern Library 1950).
146. Niccolo Machiavelli is considered as the “first commentator of power,”
and his work, The Prince, serves as a complex treatise in political realism.
See id. xxvi–xxxi.
147. The Association of British Insurers (“ABI”) announced in a press release made in November 1992 that British insurers decided to exclude terror-
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quired minimal regulation in the past.148 However, in light of
terrorist attacks on the British mainland throughout the 1990s,
the government was faced with a potential economic crisis.149 In
1992, the U.K. resolved the issue of insurance and reinsurance
coverage for terrorism through a pool reinsurance system
(known as “Pool Re”).150 The British Parliament passed the Terrorism Reinsurance Act of 1993151 in order to establish “Pool Reinsurance Co., Ltd.”152 This government action occurred in the
wake of the Irish Republican Army’s (“IRA”) bombings of Bishopsgate and St. Mary Axe in the financial district of England.153
The nation’s damages for both bombings were around $2 billion
dollars.154

ism insurance coverage in light of upcoming reinsurance treaties renewable
on January 1, 1993. Nicholas Munday, UK Commercial Property Insurance:
Terrorism Pool Put to the Test, INT. I.L.R. 1993, 1(5), at 124. For more general
information on the insurance industry’s regulation in the U.K., see Ambereen
Salamat & Jonathan Teacher, United Kingdom — General Framework and
Conduct of Business, in THE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO INSURANCE AND
REINSURANCE 2003, 79 (Rob Mannix et al. eds., 2003) and the U.K.’s Financial
Services Authority (FSA) Handbook of Rules and Guidance, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
148. See John Young, United Kingdom, in THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING
INSURANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, (Euromoney Publications et al., 1991).
149. For an in depth analysis of the U.K.’s terrorism insurance issues in the
1990s, see Bice, supra note 30, 446–64.
150. Jane Croft and Jean Eaglesham, ‘Insurer of Last Resort’ Set to Extend
Its Cover, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 19, 2002, at 5.
151. Reinsurance Act (Acts of Terrorism), 1993, ch. 18, § 1(1) (Eng.). See
also Symon Ross, UK Office of Fair Trading to Exempt Pool Re from Competition Legislation, INS. DAY, Feb. 9, 2004, available at 2004 WL 57515055 (reporting that the U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) decided that Pool Re’s
terrorism coverage should be exempt from the nation’s competition law). For
a time line that displays the history of Pool Re, see Provisions of Terrorism
and Riot Coverage in Different Countries, Astre Scor, at http://astre.scor.com
/astrehelp/en/Assur/inc/extensionuk/terrorism.htm#Insurance (last visited
Feb. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Astre Scor report].
152. See Michael Pollack, Bills Seek Stability in Insurance for Terrorist Acts,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at S1.
153. Alex Beatty, Technical Support: Political Risk; Bombs Away?,
REINSURANCE MAG., Aug. 31, 1998, at 18; Barnes, supra note 142.
154. For estimates of the costs the U.K. incurred in 1993 allegedly due to
the IRA’s bombings, see Beatty, supra note 153, at 18 (noting that the costs of
the St. Mary Axe explosion equaled to approximately $500 million) and Barnes, supra note 142, (estimating costs of the Bishopsgate explosion at $1.5
billions dollars).
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Pool reinsurance differs from the usual insurance practice of
subdividing risk by spreading a specific property’s risk among
many shareholders; rather, pooling creates a collection of numerous individual risks, not individually subdivided, which are
grouped together.155 The program specifically covers the insurers of commercial properties, and residential properties in
commercial ownership.156 Pool Re serves as a governmental insurance mechanism that joins insurers together under government supervision in order to financially prepare for any potential massive losses incurred as a result of terrorism. The government-established Pool Re system works as a mutual insurance company157 incorporated under the “Companies Acts,”158
after having gained authorization from Britain’s Department of
Trade and Industry (“DTI”),159 providing reinsurance coverage
under the regulations of the “Insurance Companies Act of
1982.”160 The British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
runs Pool Re as a quasi-governmental entity.161 However, a tribunal oversees any challenges to the Secretary of State’s decisions.162 Currently, a small staff runs Pool Re with an annual
expense budget of £1 million (approximately $1.5 million).163
Hence, the British Parliament intended to establish a reinsurance arrangement that would guarantee that Britain’s industry and commerce would continue to receive terrorism insurance coverage.164 In this way, the British Parliament felt
that it could assist the nation’s injured insurance industry and
155. Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 4.
156. See Steve Atkins, UK Terrorism Insurance — Where Are We Now?,
Insurance Institute of London, Jan. 23, 2003, at http://www.iilondon.co.uk/
ppt/Satkins23103.PPT (last visited Dec. 12, 2003).
157. Munday, supra note 147.
158. Companies Acts, 1985, ch. 6, § 1 (Eng.).
159. For more information, see the U.K.’s Department of Trade and Industry web page at http://www.dti.gov.uk/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
160. Insurance Companies Act, 1982, ch. 50 (Eng.). See Mark Stallworthy,
The Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993, I.B.F.L. 1993, 12(3), at 21.
161. See Beatty, supra note 153, at 18. Pool Re entered into a retrocession
agreement with the U.K.’s Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on July
30, 1993. Astre Scor report, supra 151, at para. 10.
162. This tribunal consists of Pool Re representatives and government officials, and this tribunal holds the final say. Barnes, supra note 142.
163. See id.; Peter Gregoire & Belinda Schofield, Insurance: A New Brand of
Terror, LEGAL WEEK, June 5, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8422875.
164. See Beatty, supra note 153, at 18.
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at the same time regain the ability to insure against terrorism
in such a way that would also secure the State’s benefit.165 According to British legislative representatives, Pool Re’s establishment would also guarantee that Britain would incur “zero
costs” for terrorism claims after several years of implementation.166 This assertion has proven accurate as Pool Re has met
several claims without requiring any financial assistance from
the U.K. government.167
As a result of Pool Re’s financial soundness, the U.K. government’s reinsurance scheme allows for the accumulation of
monetary funds that ultimately shelters the British government
and Pool Re’s participant insurers from exorbitant liability exposure.168 In the program’s earlier stages, Pool Re even dispersed its remaining yearly profits among all its participating
entities.169 Moreover, Pool Re has worked in the U.K.’s favor
since the government only acts as “retrocessionaire” to its own
pool reinsurance program.170 Only the complete depletion of
Pool Re’s financial reserves would require the government to
cover any remaining uncovered costs, and many argue that Pool
Re could now easily handle a major catastrophe in the U.K.171

165. See U.K. Treasury Announcement, Changes to the Pool Re Scheme,
July 23, 2002, at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/61876/ACF1D0D.PDF
(last visited Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter U.K. Treasury Announcement].
166. The Way We Live Now, CONV. & PROP. LAW, Nov/Dec 1993, at 418–20
(noting that within its first year Pool Re was expected to have an income of
£350 million, which shows that the government established reinsurance pool
program could also be profitable).
167. See Barnes, supra note 142; HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8.
168. As of December 2000, Pool Re’s accumulated surplus equaled to approximately £665 million. Pool Re and Terrorism Insurance in Great Britain,
TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN UPDATE, Oct. 2001, at 3, available at http://ww
w.tillinghast.com/tillinghast/publications/publications/till_update_uk/Uk_Poo
l_Re_and_Terrorism/2002052111.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
TILLINGHAST UPDATE].
169. As of Jan 1, 2003, Pool Re no longer provides insurers with surplus
gains due to the program’s expansion of terrorism coverage, as the program
now requires an increased amount of revenue in order to cover its increased
exposure. See U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165.
170. See Bice, supra note 30, at 453–56.
171. However, the British Pool Re system has not been tested in its full
capacity, being that very few claims materialized after the early 1990s. See
Andrew Cave, City — Companies Pay Double for Insurance Against Terrorism,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 4, 2003, at 31, available at 2003 WL 2831376.
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Insurers in Britain wishing to offer terrorism insurance can
group with other insurers in order to minimize the impact of
any potential terrorist losses. However, Pool Re requires that
reinsurers obtain terrorism coverage for all of their portfolio
properties, not only for their high-risk properties.172 Thus, Pool
Re spreads the volume of risky coverage onto less risky properties nationwide. Before gaining terrorism insurance, each insurer seeking terrorism coverage for their properties must be
assessed according to three factors: (1) an insured’s aggregate
value of total properties insured; (2) the location of the property
at risk;173 and (3) the property’s target risk.174 Pool Re divides
the British mainland into four zones: the first covers the U.K.’s
highest risk areas, which covers the heart of London and
Westminster; the second covers the rest of London as well as
major cities and their business districts; the third encompasses
the rest of the England except Devon and Cornwall; and the
forth covers the U.K.’s counties and towns in the outskirts of
the towns of Scotland and Wales.175
The U.K. government sets insurers coverage liability based
on Pool Re’s “retention” requirements.176 Pool Re originally set
U.K. insurers’ terrorism coverage retention at £100,000;177 however, as of January 1, 2003, Pool Re now implements a “per
event retention” and “annual aggregate limit” model.178 This
model was formulated as a result of the September 11 attacks
in order to increase terrorism insurers’ retention rates in the
event of multiple attacks on the U.K.179 This new method caps
172. Some property owners turn to alternatives for their “single location
basis” properties that require terrorism insurance coverage. Pollack, supra
note 152, at S1.
173. See id. Properties located in Central London, for example, have premium rates of “0.144 percent or $144 for every $1 million of coverage.” Id.
174. See Bice, supra note 30, at 451–53.
175. Beatty, supra note 153, at 18.
176. Pool Re’s retention requirements refer to the total costs that an individual insurer bears based on the “number of heads of cover affected.” U.K.
Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 2–5.
177. This amount totals to $157,000. Sarah Veysey, United Kingdom Expands the Scope of Pool Re Coverage, BUS. INS., July 23, 2002, available at
http://www.buisnessinsurance.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?newsId=1127 (last visited
Jan. 30, 2004).
178. U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 3.
179. Id. The U.K.’s concern was based on the September 11 legal battles
between insured owners and insurance companies with respect to the number
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insurers’ exposure both on a terrorist event and per annum basis.180 Insurers presently have a maximum industry-wide retention of £30 million per event and £60 million per annum.181 Furthermore, these retention rates will increase annually in a predetermined manner up until January 1, 2006, which the British
government and private insurance industry hope will help reinsurers take a larger a role in terrorism insurance coverage.182

of occurrences of terrorist attacks that insurance companies had to cover as a
result of their contractual agreements with their clients. See SR Intern.
Business Ins. Co. Ltd. v. World Trade Center Properties L.L.C., 222 F. Supp.
2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2002), aff’d, World Trade Center Properties, L.L.C.
v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 345 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (construing the
World Trade Center’s insurance binder agreement as implicating that the
insurers were responsible for the occurrences of one event and not for two).
The U.K. has also faced the U.S.’ September 11 issue regarding the number of
occurrences. See Gillian D. Bell, Terrorism and Insurance, KSB Law, at
http://www.ksblaw.co.uk/articles/property/propart13.html (last visited Jan.
18, 2004). The U.K. Court of Appeals handled the issue of multiple occurrences, stating that a single occurrence requires either the unity of time or the
unity of place. Mann v. Lexington Insurance Co, [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm.)
163; 2000 WL 976023 (QBD (Comm. Ct)), rev’d, [2001] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 28;
2000 WL 1421262 (CA). See also Stempel, supra note 43, at 832–43 (analyzing the number of occurrences insurance issue in the U.S. due to the September 11 attacks); James E. Branigan, Insurance and Risk Management in
Commercial Real Estate Transactions: A New World of Concerns, 489
PLI/REAL 59 (2003); Tara Loomis, WTC Attack is One Event, Judge Rules,
LAW.COM, Sept. 26, 2002, at http://www.law.com (last visited Sept. 30, 2002);
Michael F. Aylward, Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the
World Trade Center Attacks; Was It One “Occurrence” or More than One?
There Are Complexities Galore That Are Bound to Arise in Insurance Contracts, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 169 (2002).
180. U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 3 (allowing insurers
the security of knowing exactly how much they owe in any one given year and
per number of terrorist attacks).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 3–4 (offering a chart that displays the per event and per annum
requirements for year up until January 1, 2006, which reports the increases
as follows: (1) January 1, 2003 — per event: £30 million, per annum: £60 million; (2) January 1, 2004 — per event: £50 million, per annum: £100 million;
(3) January 1, 2005 — per event: £75 million, per annum: £150 million; and
(4) January 1, 2006 — per event: £100 million, per annum: £200 million). Pool
Re’s new retention rates indicate the insurance industry’s maximum retention, but these figures do not represent each insurer’s liability, as this amount
will bear heavily on the distribution of claims amongst insurers in the U.K.
Id. at 4.
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Although several property owners have decided to self-insure
terrorism damages as a result of the program, the insurance
industry has benefited from Pool Re overall.183 The program’s
success sparked the British government to pass new legislation
further extending the capacity and extent of Pool Re’s terrorism
coverage.184 After the events of September 11, the British Parliament discussed the need to expand their reinsurance scheme
in order to maximize the nation’s insurance protection, but at
the same time create new incentives to increase commercial
insurance competition.185
Accordingly, the British Parliament has made monumental
changes to the Terrorism Reinsurance Act of 1993. The definition of what actually constitutes an act of terrorism has been
recently altered to comprise all destructive acts meant to terrorize the British people and government, including domestic acts
of terrorism taken by extremist radical groups such as new
wave environmentalists.186 The British government has also
expanded Pool Re’s overall coverage. Now, Pool Re also encompasses destruction caused by biological contamination, aircraft
attacks and damage by floods,187 the last of which is particularly
necessary for Britain’s well being since any terrorist attack on
183. See William Glyon, Insurance Against Terrorism, L. SOC’Y GAZETTE,
June 9, 1993, at 20.
184. Katherine Griffiths, News Analysis: Insurers Call for Greater Government Aid to Meet Terrorism Bill; Evidence is Mounting that Lack of Terror
Cover is Exacerbating the US Business Downturn, INDEP. (LONDON), Feb. 12,
2002, at 15 (commenting that the “U.S. is also grappling with [the issues of
terrorism reinsurance coverage] but it is at a less advanced stage than the
U.K.”).
185. Pool Re Scheme, U.K. Parliament 73100, available at http://www.parli
ament.the-stationary-off…0102/cmhansrd/cm020723/text/20723w21.htm (last
visited Nov. 12, 2003). See also U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note
165.
186. See Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, ch. 18, § 2(2) (Eng.)
(“[‘A]cts of terrorism’ means acts of persons acting on behalf of, or in connection with, any organisation which carries out activities directed towards the
overthrowing or influencing, by force or violence, of Her Majesty's government
in the United Kingdom or any other government de jure or de facto.”). See
also U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 5.
187. Yvette Essen, Pool Re Offers Terrorism Cover, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), July 24, 2002, at 29. This expansive coverage, however, does not cover
electronic hacking and virus damages, as the British government feels that it
is difficult to prove that such damage actually results from a terrorist attack.
U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 2.
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London’s enormous dam could potentially flood a huge portion
of the metropolitan area.188 In addition, the British parliament
has made arrangements to further extend terrorism insurance
coverage to cover nuclear contamination.189 These legal changes
ensure the industry’s well-being and mark a savvy grasp of the
ever expanding varieties of terrorist activity.190
2. The U.K.’s Public Terrorism Insurance in Northern Ireland
In Northern Ireland, however, where damages from terrorist
activity have become part of the region’s everyday reality, most
insurers refuse outright to assume the risk of terrorist-caused
property damage, and this tendency especially holds true in the
case of commercial properties.191 The Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act of 1993 does not cover Northern Ireland under Section 3(2) of the statute.192 Rather, the British government directly takes responsibility for terrorism damage recovery, acting
as the insurer itself.193
Two pieces of legislation require the direct payment of terrorist insurance claims by the British government: the Criminal
Injuries to Properties (Compensation) Act of 1971194 and the

188. See id.
189. U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 5.
190. See Cave, supra note 171, at 31 (reporting that the U.K. has expanded
it coverage in order to adapt to new terrorism concerns). C.f. Gregory Pressman, Attacks Require Fresh Look at Old Concepts, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 26, 2001, at
S1 (discussing the changing concerns that exist with respect to terrorism).
191. See House of Lords, Manchester Bombing: Restoration of City Centre,
U.K. Parliament, Dec. 11, 1996, available at http://www.parliament.thestationary-of…697/ldhansrd/vo961211/text/61211-01.htm (last visited Jan. 5,
2004); Teresa Hunter, City – Money – Insurance – Insurers Press the Panic
Button Alarmed by the Prospect of Chemical or …, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Mar.
30, 2003, available at 2003 WL 7194529.
192. Reinsurance Act (Acts of Terrorism), 1993, ch.18, § 3(2) (Eng.). See
Stallworthy, supra note 160.
193. Richard W. Stevenson, Britain to Help Insurers Cover Terrorism Risks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at D2. Insurers presently provide normal insurance coverage for domestic property and automobiles in Northern Ireland;
however, a governmental compensation agency primarily reimburses the costs
for commercial property damage caused by terrorism, and it also compensates
victims of terrorism in Northern Ireland as well. See Hunter, supra note 191.
194. Criminal Injuries to Property (Compensation) Act, N. Ir. Stat., ch. 8
(1971).
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Criminal Damage (Compensation) Order of 1977.195 These two
acts obligate the British government to compensate property
owners in Northern Ireland who are harmed by terrorist acts.196
The government covers terrorist-caused damage claims from
premiums paid to the government through tax revenues.197 Reimbursement for damages inflicted by terrorist activity requires
three steps: (1) regional police must authenticate that terrorists
actually caused the property damage; (2) each property owner
must obtain a certificate proving the validity of their claim; and
(3) owners may then establish their compensation claim against
the British government after presenting their certificate.198
Many insurance specialists, however, argue that this type of
government insurance program encourages false claims.199 British officials have discovered numerous alleged compensation
claims for self-inflicted damages under the rubric of terrorist
activity.200 In fact, the British government is primarily concerned with systematic fraudulent claims where IRA sympathizers purposely allow the IRA to damage their property, in
order to split governmental cash settlements with them.201 In
addition, resentment also exists due to the government’s differing insurance approaches on the U.K. mainland and in Northern Ireland.202 Nevertheless, with practically no insurers covering major terrorist damages, governmental subsidy is the region’s only plausible system for redeveloping terrorist-stricken
regions.203

195. Criminal Damage (Compensation) Order, N. Ir. Stat., No. 1247 (1977).
196. See Bice, supra note 30, at 463–64.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 449; Gloyn, supra note 183, at 20. Presently, an act of terrorism
that would satisfy the compensation certification requirement would be an act
as defined by the “Terrorism Act 2000.” Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11 (Eng.).
199. Insurance specialists refer to the risk of fraudulent claims as ex post
moral hazard. Gollier, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that 10% of the insurance
industry’s automobile and homeowner insurance premiums stem from fraudulent claims, and that larger penalties could potentially deter policyholders
from making fraudulent insurance claims).
200. Insuring Against Terror, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 19.
201. Id.
202. House of Lords, Trade and Industry — Terrorism, U.K. Parliament,
Nov. 1, 1996, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationary-of…697/cm
hansrd/vo961101/text/61101w04.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
203. See Hunter, supra note 191.
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During the 1990’s, the British government was able to partially remedy the issue of liability exposure through political
and legal means.204 The U.K. government took significant steps
to decrease the resentment that its controversial measures fostered when combating the IRA.205 Due to the IRA’s terrorist efforts, the U.K. had implemented many controversial mechanisms for countering terrorism, such as: exclusion orders, which
banned certain people in Northern Ireland from entering the
U.K.’s mainland without a trial; and internment powers that
allowed police to hold a suspect in detention without trial.206
However, in 1997, the U.K. changed its approach in handling
the IRA threat, when the British Parliament repealed its previous exclusion orders and internment measures.207 In addition,
the U.K. also expanded its definition of criminal terrorism in
order to include serious instances of terrorism.208 The ratification of the Good Friday Peace Agreement209 minimized the
threat of IRA terrorism due to the prospect of peace between
the British government and Northern Ireland activists.210 Even
though the peace agreement does not guarantee the compliance
of other IRA splinter organizations,211 so far it has proven beneficial to the British government since claims in Northern Ire-

204. Richard Norton-Taylor & Duncan Campbell, Measures to Counter IRA
Terrorism Will End, New Law Will Cover Whole UK and Broaden Terms For
Use of Violence, GUARDIAN, Oct. 31, 1997, available at 1997 WL 14738341. See
also Northern Ireland: 1998–1999, BBC NEWS, Oct. 23, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/539391.stm (last visited Feb. 2,
2004).
205. Norton-Taylor & Campbell, supra note 204.
206. Id. See also Kieran McEvoy, Prisoners, the Agreement, and the Political Character of the Northern Ireland Conflict, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1539
(1999); Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Northern Ireland’s Criminal Trials Without
Jury: The Diplock Experiment, 5 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 239 (1999).
207. Norton-Taylor & Campbell, supra note 204.
208. Id.
209. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch.47, pts. I–IX. The Good Friday agreement is also known as the Belfast Agreement. For an online version of this
statute and more information on the Good Friday agreement, see the Northern Ireland Office’s website at http://www.nics.gov.uk/htbin/betsie/parser.pl/
0005/www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980047.htm#aofs (last visited Feb. 2,
2004).
210. See Beatty, supra note 153, at 18.
211. For example, “Continuity IRA” and “True IRA” are organizations opposed to the U.K.’s peace offerings. Id.

File: IreneMacro.doc

Created on: 2/14/2004 4:41 PM

Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM

2004] TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002

861

land have dramatically decreased.212 Nevertheless, the U.K.
now faces a new breed of terrorist threats and has shifted its
focus from the issues in Northern Ireland213 to the multitude of
terrorist groups that presently threaten the nation.214
B. Israel’s Tax Management and Public/Private Coordination
for the Provision of National Terrorism Insurance
Similar to the public terrorism insurance available in Northern Ireland, Israel also insures for terrorism.215 The Property
Tax and Compensation Fund216 and the Victims of Hostile Action217 grant the government the authority to assist with terror212. But see Bomb Rocks Enniskillen Following Call From Continuity IRA,
HERALD COMPANY, Feb. 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2663929.
213. See Hunter, supra note 191 (reporting current terrorism concerns in
the U.K. and Europe in general). For an overview of the U.K.’s current issues
with terrorism, see U.K. Cabinet Office, The United Kingdom and the Campaign against International Terrorism — Progress Report, Sept. 9, 2002, at
http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/sept11/coi-0809.pdf (last visited Jan.
12, 2004). After September 11, the U.K. government’s heightened safety concerns primarily focus on terrorist groups with a foreign, i.e. Middle Eastern,
cause, as the nation’s criminal laws target foreign nationals. See Kavita Modi
& John Wadham, Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom and the
Human Rights Concerns Arising from It, LIBERTY ORG., Mar. 31, 2003, at
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/resources/articles/pdfs/terrorism-apri
l-2003.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) (noting that the U.K. government’s expansion of the nation’s Terrorism Act and criminal law violates the human
rights of many individuals).
214. U.K. faces terrorism from political activists representing the concerns
of Northern Ireland, Middle East, North Africa, Kurdish Separatists, and
other domestic groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front. Alan J. Fleming,
Terrorism Coverage in the United Kingdom, DJR, at http://www.drh.com/special/wtc/w3_065.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
215. Aside from insuring terrorism, Israeli legislation also clearly protects
the interest of the insured in all insurance matters as, for example, the nation’s laws require that insurance changes can be made only if they are favorable or “more beneficial” to the insured party. See David M. Sassoon, Legal
Aspects of Insurance, in ISRAELI BUSINESS LAW: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE 337, 337–
39 (Alon Kaplan et al., 1996). Israel’s Insurance Contract law of 1981 establishes these pro-consumer provisions. Insurance Contract Law, 1981, 35
L.S.I. 91, (1980/1981). For an online copy of this law, see the website of Levitan, Sharon & Co. at http://www.israelinsurancelaw.com/site/index.php?module=ContentExpress&func=display&btitle=CE&mid=&ceid=61 (last visited
Dec. 15, 2004).
216. Property Tax and Compensation Fund, (1961), 15 L.S.I. 101,
(1960/1961).
217. Victims of Hostile Action, (1970), 24 L.S.I. 131, (1969/1970).
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ist-caused damages.218 Through these two pieces of legislation,
the Israeli government both funds and administers terrorism
insurance for citizens, and in certain instances even for tourists.219 Each program, however, governs a particular domain:
the Property Tax and Compensation Fund covers property and
casualty insurance and the Victims of Hostile Action covers life
and health insurance.220
Under the Property Tax and Compensation Fund, the Israeli
government, through the Israeli Income and Property Tax
commission,221 collects a property tax primarily from Israeli
businesses.222 The Property Tax Commission then reimburses
claims resulting from terrorism, but up to the property’s market
value immediately before an attack.223 The nation’s compensation fund also covers the loss of household items at “full replacement value” without accounting for depreciation.224 However, due to the high number of property damage occurring in a
commercial area after an attack, the tax commission takes on
the role of fixing the damage through “price adjusters” and con-

218. For the history behind Israel’s development of its government compensation programs, see Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation For Harm
Caused By Terrorism: Lessons Learned in The Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L.
REV. 335, 353–55 (2003) (starting from the nation’s formation to the present).
219. See Terrorism Insurance: Alternative Programs for Protecting Insurance Consumers, 107th Cong. 8 (2001), (testimony of Thomas J. McCool, Managing Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs), available at http
://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gao/terrins102401mccool.pdf (last visited Jan.
12, 2004).
220. Id.
221. For more information, see Israel’s Income and Property Tax Commission’s website at http://www.mof.gov.il/itc/eng/mainpage.htm (last visited Jan.
5, 2004).
222. HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8.
223. Id. Property owners can receive compensation for all of their “real
damages,” which means that the government reimburses the lesser amount of
either: (1) the “difference between the value of the asset before the damage
occurred and the market value of the asset immediately after the damage
occurred;” or “the cost of restoring the asset to its prior condition.” Sommer,
supra note 218, at 356.
224. Sommer, supra note 218, at 355. The Commission compensates household items such as “furniture, appliances, electronics, books, and similar
items,” but it does not provide coverage for “jewelry, art, antiques, and cash.”
Id. at 355, n.124.
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tractors.225 If a property owner wishes to obtain greater coverage, private or additional state coverage is available in order to
account for any discrepancies in the State’s replacement price
evaluations.226
Meanwhile, the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law provides coverage for the personal costs incurred from terrorist
harm through a state program called Law for the Compensation
of Victims of Hostile Action,227 which the National Insurance
Institute (“NII”) administers.228 The situations that can qualify
under this statute are quite numerous, as the legislation covers
any harm that may occur to an Israeli citizen, resident or visitor that faces harm due to a terrorist attack.229 In addition, the
225. Id. at 356. Thus, the Israeli Tax Commission takes on the role of restoring terrorist stricken property, despite the fact that the Property Tax
Compensation Fund law states that individuals are to be financially compensated. Id. However, the nation seems to be benefiting from this administrative system, as it “significantly reduces the amount of time it takes for life to
return to normal following a terrorist attack.” Id.
226. See HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8.
227. See 24 L.S.I. 131–37. See also Howard Kunreuther, The Role of Insurance in Managing Extreme Events: Implications for Terrorism Coverage, BUS.
ECON., April 2002, at 14, available at http://www.Ideo.columbia.edu/C
HRR/Roundtable/Kureuther_Howard _Note.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
228. In 1954, the Israeli government established the National Insurance
Institute (“NII”) in order to administer Israel’s social security programs. Yehuda Kahane, Insurance In the Israeli Economy, in ISRAELI BUSINESS LAW: AN
ESSENTIAL GUIDE 341 (Alon Kaplan et al., 1996). This government agency is
responsible for the administration of various social oriented laws. Id. For
example, the NII operates the following government programs: victims of hostile activities compensation, military service salaries, unemployment insurance, alimony provisions, coverage for work related injuries, nursing care for
the elderly/disabled, child support, maternity leave payments and health insurance. Id. at 341–42. Israeli employers, employees and the self-employed
primarily finance the NII’s programs, as the government requires that they
pay “contributions” to the national program that can account for a substantial
portion of their salary and/or earnings. Id. at 342. As of January 2003, the
income ceiling for such contributions is “five times the national average wage
for both employers and employees.” NII Home Page, Definitions and Terms
Used, at http://www.btl.gov.il/English/btl_indx.asp?name=pdf/pamphlets_Eng
.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). For more information, see the NII’s website
at http://www.btl.gov.il/English/eng_index.asp (last visited Dec. 15, 2003). See
also National Insurance Institute, Compensation for Foreign Residents Victims of Hostile Acts, at http://www.btl.gov.il/English/btl_indx.asp?name=pdf/
pamphlets_Eng.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
229. The Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law defines an “enemyinflicted injury” in the following way:
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legislation loosely defines terrorist acts in such a manner that it
can even include harm caused as a result of self-defense actions
against terrorists.230 The compensation law’s definition also
mirrors to a certain extent the broad definition of terrorism
found in the Israeli Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5708–
1948, which establishes the criminality of such acts. According
to the Israeli criminal statute, a terrorist organization is one
that resorts “to acts of violence” in a calculated fashion in order
“to cause death or injury to a person” or “threats of such acts of
violence.”231 This definition is very broad,232 which means that
(1) [A]n injury caused through hostile action by military or semimilitary or irregular forces of a state hostile to Israel, through hostile
action by an organization hostile to Israel or through hostile action
carried out in aid of one of these or upon its instructions, on its behalf
or to further its aims….
24 L.S.I. 131, § 1. This statute also lists the individuals that can fall under
the category of a victim of an “enemy inflicted injury” as either: (1) “an Israel
national or resident, whether the injury was sustained in Israel or outside of
it;” or “a person who entered Israel under a visa or permit issued under the
Entry into Israel Law….” Id. § 3.
230. Sommer, supra note 218, at 339 (explaining that Israeli legislation
covers even “friendly fire,” “as is the accidental explosion of ammunition
stocked in anticipation of terrorist attacks”). However, the classification of
what actually constitutes a “hostile act” is not clear, as harm can fall into the
categories of either criminal or terrorist. Id. at 340.
231. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948). See also
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment) Law, 1980, 34–35 L.S.I. 211,
(1979/1980); Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment No. 2), 1986, 39
L.S.I. 229, (1984/1986). For the current English translation of the above law
and its amendments up until 1993, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07tu0 (last visited Jan. 10,
2004).
232. In fact, the statute also makes it illegal for an Israeli citizen to sympathize terrorist groups by publishing, in a written or verbal manner, any words
of praise or sympathy for terrorist groups. See Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948) at § 4. But cf. U.S. Patriot Act 18 U.S.C.A. §
2339(B) (section entitled “Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations”) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST.
amend. I (In contrast to this particular Israeli law’s approach to speech and
association, the U.S. Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no
laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise of
speech thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” which
offers a very different national approach to the handling of opinions and expressions contrary to the State). See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1055–1306 (6th ed. 2000) (providing historical
background and analysis for the development of free speech in the U.S.);

File: IreneMacro.doc

Created on: 2/14/2004 4:41 PM

Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM

2004] TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002

865

any such act is compensated under the nation’s insurance program. Moreover, victims also have the presumption of an occurrence being a terrorist attack in their favor, as the Victims of
Hostile Action Law explains that “[w]here a person has been
injured under circumstances affording reasonable grounds for
believing that he [or she] has sustained an enemy inflicted injury, the injury shall be regarded as enemy inflicted unless the
contrary is proved.”233 When the National Insurance Institute
determines that the applicant has a legitimate claim, it then
administers the eligible victim’s compensation in a manner very
similar to the U.S. Social Security system in that it provides
medical care, lost wages, family assistance, and personal injury
settlements, with the only exception being that it also applies to
tourists visiting the nation.234
Nevertheless, the government limits its overall liability
through insurance regulation, as it does not reimburse for damages that insurance companies are forced to insure by law.235
For example, Israel does not cover certain costs such as business interruption; in such cases, businesses can find such coverage only through private insurance.236 Therefore, insurance
companies wishing to provide their business to Israeli citizens
are legally required to pay for their portion of damages caused
Miriam Gur–Arye, Can Freedom of Expression Survive Social Trauma: The
Israeli Experience, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155 (2003). But see Tracey
Topper Gonzalez, Individual Rights Versus Collective Security: Assessing the
Constitutionality of the U.S. Patriot Act, 11 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 75
(2003).
233. 24 L.S.I. 132, § 2. See also Sommer, supra note 218, at 340.
234. HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8. Israel insures practically all of the nation’s residents, differing in coverage depending on age. MEIR HETH, THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN ISRAEL 72 (1967).
235. See HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8.
236. See 15 L.S.I. 101–03 (restricting coverage to actual property damage as
the statute does not mention business interruption as falling into one of the
categories of reimbursable harm). See also Kunreuther, supra note 227, at 14;
Sommer, supra note 218, at 357 (noting that this sum also includes all indirect damage such as business interruption and loss of earnings). This limitation has proved restraining as many business owners have faced up to an 80%
deduction in reduced business as a result of the high frequency of terrorist
activities occurring in the nation’s commercial areas. Id. at 358. However,
the Israeli government has decided to potentially cover business interruption
damages resulting from terrorism if the government approves such a claim.
Id. at 358.
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by any given terrorist attack.237 Through the Israeli government’s strict division of fiscal responsibility between government and insurers, the insurance industry can comfortably issue insurance knowing in advance that they will not be responsible for the entire risk of property damage.
IV. DOMESTIC LEGAL ANALYSIS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL
EXAMPLES
“Lay plans for the accomplishment of the difficult before it
becomes difficult; make something big
by starting with it when small.”238
– Lao Tzu, Taoist philosopher239
A. U.S. Government Assistance — Prudent Solution, Short
Term Scapegoat, or a Little Bit of Both?
A comparative legal analysis of TRIA provides important insights and potential solutions to some of the problems that the
U.S. terrorism insurance program now faces. Part IV lays the
foundation for this Note’s international analysis, beginning
with a critical analysis of TRIA that explains the legislation’s
limitations as well as its accomplishments. This analysis is
then followed by an international comparison of TRIA with the
terrorism insurance programs available in Israel and the U.K.
Through international comparison, this Note presents helpful
solutions for TRIA’s potential renewal.
1. National Issues That Remain Unresolved
As terrorists coordinate their attacks to inflict maximum
damage and devastation, they simultaneously achieve maximum exposure for their own cause.240 For this reason, the issue
237. See Sommer, supra note 218, at 358.
238. LAO TZU, TAO TE CHING 70 (D.C. Lao trans., 1963).
239. Lao Tzu, “an older contemporary of Confucius,” is believed to have
written several anthologies based on the cultivation of the proper way of life
and the true meaning of human virtue. Id. at viii. Tzu’s works, as most ancient Chinese philosophers, not only grapple with the ideals of the personal
realm, but his teachings also cover politics and ethics in terms of government
and ruling. Id. at xxviii.
240. Terrorist organizations have a “hydra-like feature,” which makes them
inherently dangerous and evasive as they can establish network characteris-
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of terrorism insurance coverage effects most dramatically the
security of properties that either have great symbolic or practical value to the U.S.241 As a result, the unavailability of terrorism coverage effects the insurability of properties that fit into
what the insurance industry classifies as “Tier 1” or “Tier 2”
properties,242 which means that they face a higher risk of serving as targets of another terrorist attack.243 In addition, since
the cost of terrorism insurance remains extremely high, owners
of lower potential risk property currently refrain from purchasing terrorism insurance.244 Therefore, TRIA does not insure the
entire nation against terrorism; instead, it primarily serves as a
mechanism for providing government reinsurance coverage for
insurers wishing to cover properties that are commercial or

tics that allow for individual actors to spontaneously act on a “common cause.”
See Woo, supra note 20, at 3, 9 (highlighting Margaret Thatcher’s observations on the IRA media’s coverage, as she noted that the “oxygen of publicity”
fuels the terrorist drive to inflict harm).
241. See Peter R. Orszag & Joseph A. Pechman, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development and the
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Sept. 4, 2003, at 7 (arguing for government intervention), available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/cip/resources/energy/orszag09
0403.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2004); Saxton, supra note 31, at 6. But see
Loubier & Aro, supra note 56, at 18 (noting that terrorism can potentially
occur anywhere and that the risk does not rest only on landmark assets).
242. See Mario Suarez & Steven Abrams, Outside Counsel: Terrorism Risk
Insurance and the Real Estate Industry, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 10, 2002, at 4.
Moody’s investor service has established terrorism risk categories in order to
classify buildings: Tier 1 properties include genuine ‘trophy’ buildings, regionally well-known properties or assets located near trophy assets; Tier 2 assets
consist of large “Class A or B-type central business district buildings and major shopping malls;” and the Tier 3 category includes all others assets. Id.
243. Id. But see DARIUS LAKDAWALLA & GEORGE ZANJANI, INSURANCE, SELF
PROTECTION, AND THE ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 9215, 2002) (“Potential targets of terrorism have incentives to protect themselves against attack, but rational terrorists will substitute away from fortified targets and [instead shift their attention] toward[s]
vulnerable ones.”), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W9215.pdf (last
visited Nov. 12, 2002).
244. Terrorism insurance coverage in its very essence is primarily commercial insurance concern. See Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 20 (comparing
terrorism insurance with natural catastrophe insurance, which tends to primarily cover “personal homeowner insurance”).
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have a high profile status –– either symbolically or economically.245
In fact, insurance analysis companies report that only 25% of
owners with properties worth $100 million or more throughout
the U.S. have elected to acquire terrorism insurance.246 Property owners currently refrain from purchasing terrorism coverage because insurance companies continue to charge substantial premiums for the additional coverage.247 Therefore, despite
TRIA’s mandate that all U.S. insurance carriers must make
245. See Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 20; Woo, supra note 20, at 10
(noting that terrorist can “switch intermittently between political, commercial
and economic targets”). See also Goldberg, supra note 38, at 549; U.S. Office
of Public Affairs, Treasury Department Announces Proposed Regulation Implementing Claims Procedures Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, (quoting Jeffrey S. Bragg, Executive Director of the U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance
program, in regards to his statement on the program’s role as a reinsurance
provider), Nov. 25, 2003, at http://www.treas.gov/press/release/js1022.htm
(last visited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. Office of Public Affairs, TRIA Announcement]. But see LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 17 (This
article clarifies how the effect of terrorism on commercial properties can ultimately concern the nation. It provides the following illustrative example: “A
construction project founding in Manhattan due to lack of affordable insurance coverage may be seen as a national public policy issue, while similar
foundering associated with windstorm or earthquake insurance coverage is
not.”).
246. Christian Murray, City Properties Lack Terror Insurance, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 27, 2003, at A46. Interestingly enough, however, smaller and mid-sized
companies that possess property have shown a greater tendency to purchase
terrorism coverage since terrorism insurance is less costly for properties in
their price bracket. Id. See also Barbara Pinckney, Response to Terrorism
Insurance is Underwhelming, BUS. REV., April 21, 2003, at http://www.biz
journals.com/albany/stories/2003/04/21/story2.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2004);
Jon Chesto, Few Seek Terrorism Insurance, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 24, 2003, at
23. Due to the limited purchasers of terrorism insurance, insurers complain
about the costs TRIA imposes by requiring stringent notification standards.
Sam Friedman, Terrorism Rate Hikes To Fall To Single-Digits, NAT.
UNDERWRITER — PROP. & CASUALTY, Nov. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis
News & Bus. Library. The U.S. Treasury Department has also taken notice of
the nation’s low rate of terrorism insurance purchases even after TRIA’s enactment. See Ugoletti, Implementing TRIA, supra note 11, at 6.
247. See John W. Schoen, Firms Still Shun Terror Insurance, MSNBC, Feb.
24, 2003, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/Default.aspx?id=3073016&p1=0
(last visited Jan. 1, 2004). See, e.g., Jill Cueni-Cohen, School Board Declines
Insurance for Terrorism, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 2003, at N8. But
see, e.g., Jill Cueni-Cohen, Districts Insure Against Terrorism, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 2003, at N2. See also Bragg, supra note 9, at 15.
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terrorism insurance “available” to their customers in a manner
that offers protection similar to other property insurance plans,
prices remain high.248
Premiums remain elevated because insurers find themselves
in a situation that insurance specialists refer to as ex ante
moral hazard.249 Insurers raise their premiums because terrorist-risk mitigation still remains inefficient.250 Although such
price setting may prove reasonable for the insurance industry, a
limited amount of consumer force regulates the premiums and
deductibles that insurers need to pay while participating in
TRIA’s government insurance program.251 TRIA establishes the
insurance industry’s deductible for claim payments,252 but it
248. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(c).
However, the U.S. treasury is currently evaluating whether to continue
TRIA’s “mandatory availability” provision for upcoming insurance contracts
that are approaching renewal. See U.S. Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Announces Administrative Changes to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program,
Dec. 23, 2003, at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1067.htm (last visited
Jan. 5, 2004). Commercial insurance lines tend to face less government regulation as commercial insurance firms “appear to be less willing and perhaps
less able to marshal public protests against unfair premiums.” Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 20.
249. “Ex ante moral hazard” refers to insurers’ anticipation of a low degree
of risk prevention and a greater frequency of losses, which ultimately results
in higher premiums. Gollier, supra note 14, at 10. In general, however,
“moral hazard” describes an insurer’s increased probability of loss due to policyholders’ “carelessness” in mitigating an insured potential harm. Kunreuther, supra note 227, at 9. The issue of moral hazard poses a significant
dilemma for the insuring of terrorism under TRIA, as Professor Kunreuther
explains that “[i]t is…extremely difficult to control behavior once a person is
insured.” Id. at 9. Government assistance, on the one hand, helps influence
self-protection by encouraging the purchase of terrorism insurance, but, on
the other hand, such policies can also discourage self-protection as insurance
can cover most of a policy holder’s potential losses, making it more efficient to
refrain from any further protection expenditures. LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI,
supra note 243, at 2.
250. See Kunreuther, supra note 227, at 10.
251. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 39 (Yale University Press, 1986) (noting that local
consumer groups are less organized and financed than the U.S. insurance
industry to truly influence state insurance legislation). See also FEDERALSTATE REGULATION OF THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE 8–9 (Paul W.
MacAvoy ed., 1977) (discussing the regulation of property-liability insurance
companies in the U.S.); Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 20.
252. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 102(7).
But see Department of Treasury, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 40, 9815 (Feb. 28, 2003) (to

File: IreneMacro.doc

870

Created on: 2/14/2004 4:41 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM

[Vol. 29:2

does not regulate the insurance industry’s premiums.253 Most
importantly, however, if the insurance industry’s deductibles
prove low, the U.S. will assume much of the financial burden of
another terrorist attack.254 In other words, taxpayers will have
to pay the cost of an attack despite the insurance mechanisms
currently available.255
For insurers that have the capacity to provide terrorism insurance at reasonable, albeit still high, rates, TRIA also creates
a discrepancy between different states’ coverage.256 TRIA requires that each insurer’s terrorism insurance cover items that
fall within its usual property and casualty coverage plans.257
However, each state has its own regulations on matters that
insurance companies must cover in their plans.258 As a result,
be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50) (noting that the government is currently investigating special purpose entities that insurance companies may be establishing in order to circumvent paying their deductible requirements).
253. See Pinckney, supra note 246; Tamara Loomis, Rates Mixed After Terror Insurance Act, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 2003, at 1. See also Murray, supra note
246, at A46 (providing the insurance industry’s perspective on this matter of
premium regulation and highlighting the fact that many insurers still do not
feel that they have the capital necessary to comfortably price terrorism).
254. Howard B. Epstein & Theodore A. Keyes, Corporate Insurance Law;
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002: Analysis and Review, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 8, 2003, at 3. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 23 (explaining that effective
government assistance requires that the government’s deductibles in offering
reinsurance coverage should also correspond to the insurance market’s capacity).
255. See BROWN ET AL., FEDERAL TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE 8 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9271, 2002), available at http://www.
nber.org/papers/w9271 (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).
256. See Aon Report, supra note 121 at 4. See also ABRAHAM, supra note
251, at 37 (pointing out the disorganization of state insurance legislation due
to the variations present from state to state).
257. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(c).
258. McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2000). Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 106(a). Treasury Department, Interim Guidance Concerning Definition of Insurers, Scope of Insurance
Coverage, and Disclosures Mandated by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act,
13–14 (listing each states’ residual market mechanism); Treasury Department, Interim Guidance Concerning New Statutory Disclosure Mandatory
Availability Requirements of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 5
(explaining TRIA’s “make available” requirement as applied to each state’s
insurance laws). See also PMA Insurance Group, Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002: Outline (noting that the states retain their authority to allow
insurance companies to reinstate terrorism exclusion clauses in their prop-
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many property owners may have a “false sense of security”
about the terrorism coverage that their insurance provider offers them.259 In the event of another terrorist attack, insurance
companies may have opportunities to make use of such legislative loopholes to their clients’ detriment.260 In addition, since
the legislation is silent on the states’ role in regulating terrorism insurance coverage, tension between federal and state law
may also arise.261
Thus, the issue remains: what happens to property owners
who choose to refrain from obtaining terrorism insurance?262 In
erty/casualty policies), at http://www.pmagroup.com/risk_tria_legislationsu
mmary.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004); Bragg, supra note 9, at 15.
259. See US Insurance Review; US Insurance Stars Aim to Earn Stripes,
POST MAG., Dec. 4, 2003, at 16 (noting the limitation of terrorist acts that
TRIA includes in its definition of terrorism) [hereinafter Insurance Review].
For example, the typical model consumer disclosure forms, which most insurers used to notify their clients, do not specify any state law implications on
terrorism insurance coverage. Sample disclosure forms can be found on the
Treasury Department’s website at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domesticfinance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/press/ (last visited Jan. 5,
2004) and on the NAIC website at http://www.naic.org/pressroom/release/
dislcoseonefinal.pdf or http://www.naic.org/pressroom/release/disclosetwofinal
.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
260. See Myra E. Lobel, Current Issues in Drafting Reinsurance Contracts,
854 PLI/COMM 7, 39 (2003) (noting that there are currently many variations
on “TRIA clauses,” but due to the lack of significant case law on the subject
the interpretation and enforceability of such clauses remain unclear). An
important issue that remains unresolved is how TRIA’s mandated terrorism
coverage integrates with other coverage issues within an insurance policy.
Aon Report, supra note 121, at 6. For example, some states require property
insurance to include fire-damage in their policies; however, in a state that
does not have such a requirement, it remains questionable whether a firerelated damage due to a terrorist attack will qualify. See id.
261. See, e.g., Department of Treasury, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 40, 9815 (Feb. 28,
2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 50) (noting that federal law currently
provides limited requirements or standards for approving insurers that can
fall under TRIA’s mandate).
262. Insurance professionals call this issue the “Samaritan’s dilemma,”
whereby the government finds itself in a difficult position when faced with
victims who have not taken precautionary steps and those who prudently
protected themselves in advance. BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 11. Nevertheless, a national policy or program helps establish a system that offers
incentives for “preventative measures” and expedites the compensation process in the event of a terrorist attack. Id. But see Orszag & Pechman, supra
note 241 (posing the line-drawing question of: “[w]here does the regulatory
process stop?”).
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effect, TRIA creates an “adverse selection” issue.263 In the case
of U.S. property terrorism insurance coverage, the adverse selection problem relates to owners who weigh their chances in
favor of not insuring their properties against terrorism-related
harm.264 There are three categories of property owners who decide to sidestep terrorism insurance coverage: those who consider their chance of facing a terrorist attack as minimal; those
who acknowledge a possibility, but choose to self-insure their
property; and/or those who weigh their losses in the hope that
the government will ultimately intervene and assist in their
recovery from any terrorist act.265 Accordingly, the U.S. government faces a host of uninsured properties and may encounter a significant financial burden should there be another terrorist attack. As a result, the nation may struggle with the
same challenge of providing additional financial relief to victims
in the event of another terrorist attack,266 which is the very

263. See Bragg, supra note 9, at 15. Adverse selection occurs when those
with a greater potential for risk disproportionately seek the protection of insurance coverage. Kunreuther, supra note 227, at 8. As a result insurers face
yielding a “negative expected return” on their insurance portfolio policies. Id.
264. Terrorism insurance in the U.S. currently displays what insurance
experts would refer to as an “extreme case” of adverse selection as agents who
face a lower terrorism-related risk consider even the current terrorism insurance premiums too high, and instead choose not to insure the risk at all. See
Gollier, supra note 14, at 9.
265. See, e.g., Civia Katz, Penn Discusses Terrorism Insurance, INTELLIGENCER J., July 16, 2003, at B7 (reporting that a Pennsylvania township declined to spend $522 for terrorism insurance coverage, as their other policies
increased from 17 to 137%); Kate Alexander, County May Pass on Terror Insurance, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 23, 2003, at B1 (setting aside reserves
to cover any potential terrorist threat). See also Insurance Review, supra note
259, at 16 (indicating that 44% of property owners who are advised to obtain
terrorism insurance refrain from making such a purchase); Sarah Veysey,
Governments Providing Terror Coverage Backstops: But a Specialist Terrorism
Insurer Closes to New Business Due to Lack of Demand, 37 BUS. INS. 23
(2003), available at 2003 WL 9138389 (reporting that although nations —
such Germany, Austria, France, Spain, and the U.K. — have assisted in the
availability of terrorism insurance, many property owners still refrain from
purchasing such cover).
266. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that social pressures after a
catastrophic event will strongly press for the government indemnification of
uninsured victims).
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situation that the U.S. government intended TRIA to address
and may ultimately prove extremely costly to tax payers.267
Commentators have also noted that TRIA reduces property
owners’ incentive to mitigate the risks and damages associated
with terrorism.268 In fact, insurance at high premiums tends to
signal the stark reality behind these observations.269 Many of
the properties that are receiving the benefit of terrorism insurance have limited mechanisms to protect their buildings and
occupants from another terrorist attack.270 For example, a
commercial building may have financial coverage for terrorism
related property and casualty losses, but its property owners at
the same time may have taken few steps to mitigate the harm.271
This discrepancy means that TRIA may protect the insurance
industry from facing a fatal blow, but it does not necessarily

267. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
101(b)(1).
268. LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 1 (arguing that government
subsidizing of terrorism coverage can potentially keep agents from protecting
themselves, which in turn raises vulnerability). Cf. Geoffrey Heal & Howard
Kunreuther, You Can Only Die Once 12–13 (April 12, 2002) (paper prepared
for the “Risk Management Strategies in an Uncertain World Conference,”
Palisades, N.Y.) (noting that insurance in theory should serve as a mechanism
for encouraging airlines to heighten security, but instead can potentially produce the opposite effect of free-loading security by airlines who face less stringent requirements for their own insurance coverage), available at
http://www.Ideo.colombia.edu/CHRR/Roundtable/Kunreuther_white.pdf (last
visited Oct. 10, 2002). See also BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 6 (noting that
“the virtues of unfettered markets is the incentives they generally provide for
market actors to invest and behave in a socially optimal fashion”).
269. See Kureuther, supra note 227, at 8–12.
270. See Thomas P. Bloch, Commercial Real Estate Leases: Selected Issues
in Drafting and Negotiating in Current Market, SH008 ALI–ABA 277, 280–82
(2003) (suggesting lease provisions for commercial landlords). Landlords have
begun to include lease provisions that provide exceptions for service interruption caused by a whole array of potential terrorist-risks and are spreading the
costs of additional security measures through lease provisions that allow for
rent escalations based on heightened security measures. Id. But see
LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 4 (suggesting that enhanced security measures can also theoretically lead to an increase of terrorist funding as
terrorists may take such actions as a sign of insecurity, which marks an accomplishment that they will seek to repeat).
271. “In fact, insurers could find it in their best interest to earn the good
will of their clients by treating claimants generously at the expense of the
government.” BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 7.
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indicate that the people occupying these insured spaces are being protected.
Another important characteristic of TRIA is that it also looks
at terrorism as being perpetuated by foreign groups.272 The U.S.
government considers terrorist groups, such as the one involved
in the September 11 attacks, as international.273 TRIA’s definition of terrorism is thus quite specific in contrast to the ISO’s
general terrorism exclusion clauses,274 and may leave potential
targets of domestic terrorism, such as the small airplane crash
in Florida275 or even Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma bombing,
uncovered altogether, rendering government intervention in
effect obsolete.
The lending industry also has some serious reservations
about TRIA, as the legislation does not provide any specifications that protect lenders.276 TRIA requires that insurers notify
their insurance carriers, but nowhere does it state that the
lender securing a mortgage for each property also needs notification.277 Accordingly, lenders argue that TRIA does not foster
communication between insurers and lenders.278 This lack of
information has proven troubling to lenders as the law does not

272. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
102(1)(A)(iv).
273. See id. See also H.R. 3210 § 19(1) (definition of an “act of terrorism”);
S. 2600 § 3(1), (definition of an “act of terrorism”).
274. See supra Part II (elaborating on the issues regarding the ISO’s definition of terrorism). See also Emanuel Gross, Democracy in the War Against
Terrorism — The Israeli Experience, 35 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 1161, 1162 (2002)
(commenting on the definition of terrorism).
275. See An Explosive Situation, INS. DAY, Jan. 8, 2002, available at LEXIS,
Nexis News & Bus. Library (discussing the light aircraft crash into the Bank
of America forty-two story building in Tampa, Florida, which involved an
American youth having allegedly sympathized with Osama bin Laden’s
cause).
276. See Kenneth M. Block & Jeffrey B. Steiner, Terror Insurance Uncertainty Still Exists Despite New Federal Law, N.Y. L.J., July 16, 2003, at 5;
Epstein & Keyes, supra note 254, at 3. For an overview of lender attorneys’
new insurance considerations as a result of September 11, see Goldberg, supra
note 38, at 548–51.
277. Block & Steiner, supra note 276. See generally Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297.
278. At this time, lenders must directly contact their borrowers in order to
figure out whether their borrowers have obtained terrorism insurance for
their mortgaged properties. Block & Steiner, supra note 276.
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require notification of their borrowers’ decision to insure or refrain from insuring against terrorism.279
2. TRIA’s Accomplishments
Although TRIA still has many issues that must be resolved in
order to be fully effective, the government program that the legislation established does alleviate some of the major problems
that the insurance industry had in underwriting terrorism, especially for trophy buildings and large commercial projects.
Since terrorist threats to property primarily stem from the
unique political positions of target nations,280 the political component of insuring terrorist risk makes terrorism coverage unfavorable to insurance and reinsurance companies,281 because
terrorist activity directly correlates to government action and
not pure probability,282 which insurers rely on and have learned

279. Id. Lenders now complain that TRIA fails to ensure that terrorism
insurance be “available” to lenders, as borrowers have the option to decline
terrorism coverage if their loan documents do not require it. Id. Nonetheless,
lenders do have the opportunity to contractually resolve these matters in their
loan documents and negotiations.
280. For example, U.S. involvement in the Middle East has driven many
terrorist groups, such as Al’ Qaeda, to seek vengeance against American culture and economy. See Yang Razali Kassim, Is the Fight Against Terrorism on
the Right Track?, BUS. TIMES (SINGAPORE), Jan. 18, 2003, available at 2003
WL 2349714. See also US Foreign Policy Amounts to International Terrorism
– Chomsky, TWN, Feb. 2, 2002, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/pa4.htm
(last visited Feb. 12, 2004). The U.K. faces dual terrorist opposition from the
IRA’s defiance towards the British government’s stronghold in Northern Ireland as well as constant terrorist threats from groups adamantly against the
nation’s Middle East foreign policy, especially due to the nation’s alliance with
the U.S. and Israel. See Fleming, supra note 214. Meanwhile, territorial
disputes spark constant conflict between Israelis and groups supporting the
Palestinian cause. See Amanda Rogers, Where is ‘Palestine’? Country-less
people live in West Bank, Gaza, FORT-WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 13, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 56484224.
281. For a more detailed discussion of this matter, see supra Part II.
282. See Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 2–3 (arguing for government intervention). The financial exposures that the private industry faces
proves troubling as U.S. bankruptcy laws limit corporation and individual’s
financial exposure to terrorism caused losses, which serves to limit the private
sector’s incentive to take preventative precautions. Id. at 3–4.
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to calculate.283 TRIA has been instrumental in promoting: (1)
investment and construction by providing insurers the financial
safety net of reinsurance necessary as the problem of insurability still troubles the reinsurance industry;284 and (2) seeks to
limit the repercussions of prolonged political involvement in the
private sector.285
Implementing national terrorism risk-exposure legislation is
undoubtedly a costly endeavor given the near impossibility of
quantifying the consequences of a major terrorist attack;286 furthermore, the financial aspects of the “catastrophic risk”287 potential of terrorist attacks urge the need for the government’s
intervention.288 Large financial reserves, however, prove difficult for insurers to accumulate due to the uncertainty of a potential “early hit” that may require more financial backing than
the limited amounts that the insurance industry can raise
within a short time.289 Infrequency, coupled with high losses,
283. See Stempel, supra note 43, at 877 (noting that the insurance industry
needs to develop analytical mechanisms that will assist underwriters in assessing the risk of terrorism).
284. See Kunreuther, supra note 227, at 7. See also BROWN ET AL., supra
note 255, at 5; Suarez & Abrams, supra note 242.
285. See Sarah Bagnall & Nicholas Wood, Insurers Seek Bomb Cover Safety
Net; Terrorist Bomb Blasts, TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 5, 1992, available at 1992
WL 10918367 (noting the concerns the U.K. government had when establishing Pool Re).
286. Actuaries are still struggling with the challenge of pricing commercial
insurance for terrorism coverage. News Round-Up; Actuaries Face Pricing
Challenge, REINSURANCE MAG., Dec. 17, 2003, at 9. See also TRIA ‘Has Helped
the US Economy’, INS. DAY, Nov. 28, 2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis News &
Bus. Library (noting the insurance industry’s present discomfort with the
underwriting of terrorism).
287. For a general discussion of what actually constitutes a “catastrophic
risk,” see John D. Pollner, Catastrophe Risk Management: Using Alternative
Risk Financing and Insurance Pooling Mechanisms, WORLD BANK, available
at http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=1421 (last visited Nov. 21,
2003).
288. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 21.
289. Id. Insurance companies depend on their ability to transfer wealth
through time in order to diversify their potential risks. Id. at 23. Furthermore, corporate finance frowns upon firms holding large financial reserves
because, in corporate world views, such accumulation of capital is a sign of
inefficiency. Id. This corporate reality, therefore, makes it difficult for insurance companies to accumulate large monetary reserves. Id. Insurance companies can also use capital markets in order to obtain the reinsurance backing
necessary to cover terrorism; however, the securitization of terrorist and
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necessitates large permanent reserves,290 but high taxes levied
on such monetary reserves also would make it impractical for
insurers to assume such responsibility.291 For this reason, the
U.S. and its international counterparts have chosen to intervene in terrorism coverage, especially when the insurance industry finds its reserves already depleted.
Specifically, TRIA now ends the insurance industry’s hunt for
reinsurance backing, as the U.S. itself serves as the reinsurer.292
The government insurance program currently provides the insurance industry with the liquidity it needs in order to insure
terrorism.293 For example, rebuilding costs for a property such
as the Empire State Building would require over $2 billion.294
TRIA now allows for the insurability of such properties and in
effect keeps insurers in the picture until they can feel comfortable with underwriting the risk for themselves.295 In addition,
insurers’ terrorism insurance premiums have in fact decreased,296 which has allowed for the provision of the terrorism
catastrophic risks in general are not presently developed enough in order to
financially support the insurance coverage of potential U.S. terrorism. BROWN
ET AL., supra note 255, at 4. See also Johnson, Gentlemen’s Agreement, supra
note 59, at 21 (explaining insurers’ need to reduce their own reserve retention
through reinsurance); Pollner, supra note 287, at 9.
290. See Pollner, supra note 287, at 19. However, certain insurance companies insuring terrorism in the U.S. may be utilizing special purpose entities in
order to circumvent paying their deductibles, which can potentially limit the
amount that TRIA can save in government reserves.
See Department of
Treasury, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 40, 9815, (Feb. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 31
C.R.F. pt. 50).
291. See Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 12 (noting that the “U.S. tax
rules require full taxation of profits that are being retained as reserves
against future losses” due to terrorist-inflicted property damage).
292. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Initial Risk Insurance Program; Initial Claims Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67101, (Dec. 1, 2003)
(to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50); U.S. Office of Public Affairs, Remarks by
Peter R. Fisher, Implementing the Terrorism Insurance Risk Act of 2002, Jan.
29, 2003, at http://wwwtreas.gov/press/releases/kd3810.htm (last visited Jan.
5, 2004).
293. See Suarez & Abrams, supra note 242, at 4.
294. Jacqueline S. Gold, Terror Insurance Fall Short; Despite New Law,
Landmark Buildings Can’t Get Full Coverage, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 13,
2003, at 1 (highlighting the price ranges of New York city properties that are
“classic” terrorist targets).
295. See Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 8.
296. Terrorism insurance premiums are now 50% lower than before TRIA’s
enactment, and various insurance surveys report that premiums for terrorism
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insurance coverage required by major construction projects and
mortgage lenders of commercial properties.297
Governments that choose — or rather are required — to intervene in terrorism insurance coverage must also prevent temporary assistance from becoming a permanent subsidy,298 all the
while balancing other national economic needs, especially during times of international insecurity.299 The U.S. government
designed TRIA in a manner that will hopefully allow the insurance market to gradually take on a larger role in terrorism insurance coverage.300 Insurer’s deductibles are set to increase
incrementally every year, and the legislation requires that
TRIP work closely with NAIC.301
The coalition between the U.S. Treasury Department and the
insurance industry creates a means of communication between
insurance companies and the U.S. government,302 which in turn
makes the government insurance program much more efficient.303 Several reinsurance companies now provide terrorism
insurance fall “between 10 to 30 percent of a property’s overall propertycasualty premiums.” Epstein & Keyes, supra note 254, at 3.
297. See Goldberg, supra note 38, at 549.
298. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 8.
299. See id. See also Gollier, supra note 14, at 27 (noting that nations intervene in the case of catastrophic risk coverage “[d]ue to [the State’s] natural
creditworthiness and its long time horizon, [it] is better shaped than insurance companies to smooth shock over time”).
300. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Initial Risk Insurance Program;
Initial Claims Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67100, (Dec. 1, 2003) (to be
codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50).
301. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(e)(6).
302. See Dennis Kelly, Treasury Issues Payment Procedures for Terrorism
Insurance Backstop, BESTWIRE, Dec. 2, 2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis News
& Bus. Library. See also Ugoletti, Implementing TRIA, supra note 11, at 6.
303. Not only does the collaboration between the insurance industry and
government make government insurance coverage more efficient, it also enhances the focus on preventing future terrorist attacks. As the insurance
underwriting industry is currently generating methods of assessing the terrorist-related risk in insuring property, these underwriting efforts also keep
the private sector informed as to national security concerns and measures
that the government takes to mitigate such concerns. For example, risk assessment companies, such as AIR Worldwide Corp., have accepted the opportunity to attempt to calculate the risk of terrorism with the help of experts in
the FBI, CIA and U.S. Defense department. Schoen, supra note 247. Had
such public/private interaction been in place prior September 11, perhaps
there would have been a greater public awareness of the terrorist risk that the
nation would ultimately face. For example, in 2000, the Pentagon conducted
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deductible coverage for insurers who participate in the program, which signals that the reinsurance industry remains in
the picture, despite the U.S. government’s intervention.304 Accordingly, it seems that TRIA does not necessarily serve as a
bailout for the insurance industry;305 rather, U.S. government
involvement lays the foundations of the terrorism underwriting
process as the insurance industry builds the expertise and capacity to cover such claims for themselves.306
B. International Lessons on National Insurance Programs
In order to decrease economic vulnerability to potential terrorist attacks, nations need to provide their own insurance
mechanisms.307 As Part III of this Note illustrated, different
nations have their own unique ways of handling the threat of
terrorism. National government insurance implementation varies greatly according to each nation’s needs. The U.K. and Israel have already developed their own means of supplying terrorism risk insurance in manners that best support the needs of
their nations. In Israel and in Northern Ireland, public insurance assistance affords property compensation for victims who
an undercover study titled “Terror 2000,” which the U.S. government coordinated in order to inform the intelligence sector about potential terrorist
threats. Woo, supra note 20, at 16. “One of the prescient conclusions of the
study” presented at this meeting forewarned that terrorist groups imminently
would attempt to “conduct simultaneous bombings, perhaps in different countries, to maximize the devastation and publicity.” Id. The study’s message
fell on deaf ears as such a devastating prospect seemed unrealistic. Id. PostSeptember 11, both the U.S. government and insurance industry now enjoy
the advantages of hind-site, and such reports will probably be taken much
more seriously in the future. Furthermore, the private sector’s involvement in
terrorism insurance coverage will also demand such government reporting in
order to prevent terrorist-related insurance losses.
304. See Terrorism — Tackling a Burning Issue, REINSURANCE, Aug. 11,
2003, at 36, available at 2003 WL 66909703 [hereinafter Tackling a Burning
Issue].
305. Cf. Barnes, supra note 142 (noting that the similar public/private insurance scheme established in the U.K. does not serve as a mere bail out for
the insurance industry).
306. See Graydon S. Staring, Law of Reinsurance pt. 5, § 23:6, para. 3
(2003); BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 8.
307. See Wastell & Elliot, supra note 19; Jorn Madslien, Insurance Industry
Adjusts, BBC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/wo
r…02/september_11_one_year_on/2207645.stm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
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face the devastation of terrorism on a more frequent basis.
Meanwhile, on the British mainland, the U.K. government supplies insurers with the reinsurance backing necessary to keep
the nation’s insurance industry involved in terrorism coverage.
These international models serve as the ideal typological templates for government intervention as each has dealt with the
insurance issues that presently plague the U.S. In order to be
economically prepared for a future terrorist attack, the U.S.
government should renew the legislation, but only after considering certain alterations that would improve the government
program’s effectiveness. The U.K. and Israeli models provide
the necessary solutions.
1. The Governmental Power to Tax: An Incentive
All in Its Own
In terms of financial risk management, Northern Ireland and
Israel’s current insurance programs spread the risk of terrorism
nationwide, with multiple taxes supporting such an insurance
option.308 Terrorism insurance in Northern Ireland, for example, seems beneficial since it allows for the entire U.K. to assume the particular region’s risks.309 However, such an assumption of risk is only viable for limited regional coverage, as evidenced by the U.K.’s limitation to Northern Ireland,310 because
geographic expansion of government responsibility would require an overwhelming tax base, thus raising implementation
costs to overwhelming levels.311 Meanwhile, a national taxation
solution such as Israel’s seemingly alleviates the burden on major metropolitan areas, but at a cost to the nation overall.312 Despite the fact that a purely public national terrorism insurance
308. However, Israel has changed its governmental insurance coverage with
respect to foreign trade risks in order to serve as the reinsurer of last resort to
insurance companies bearing the initial burden of such claims. See Foreign
Risk Up for Privatization and Split Up, ISRAELI BUS. TODAY, Mar. 31, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 10113749.
309. See Bice, supra note 30, at 463–64.
310. See id.
311. Id.
312. See HETH, supra note 234, at 172. “A substitute for market insurance
is to organize an implicit or explicit system of solidarity for the unlucky citizens through an indemnity financed by the taxpayers.” Gollier, supra note 14,
at 16.
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system would lighten the burden of insurance costs that states
such as New York and California currently face, the U.S. Accounting Office estimates that if the U.S. government solely
provided terrorism coverage, the loss to federal tax reserves
would be tremendous.313 TRIA’s private/public dichotomy solves
this problem by allowing the private insurance industry to assume responsibility for most claims, as many claims could potentially fall within the Act’s established insurers’ deductible
requirements. Despite temporary intervention on the part of
the U.S. government in the nation’s recent insurance crisis,
concerns remain regarding the permanence the federal insurance subsidies.314 If the insurance industry’s current government deductible falls too low, another attack may still leave the
U.S. vulnerable to the costs of another attack.315 Furthermore, if
the insurance industry finds comfort in the U.S. government’s
“reinsurance,” insurers may take a longer time to resume fully
insuring terrorism risk through private reinsurers. A future
attack, therefore, may still leave the government paying for
most of the risk assumed by insurers.316 However, the U.S. government faces the grimmer prospect of what might happen to
properties that decline to participate in TRIA’s program. The
political reality is that if another terrorist attack occurs, the
situation will require government assistance and compensation.317 U.S. government assistance in the aftermath of a tragic
event, therefore, fails to make use of TRIA and the insurance
industry’s expertise and goes against the very purpose of the
establishment of the U.S. government’s Terrorist Insurance
Program.318
313. See CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 27–35.
314. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 8 (pointing out that “a continuing
government role in the terrorism risk insurance market could hinder the development of private capacity to cover terrorism risk”). Cf. HILLMAN, supra
note 55, at 16 (contemplating the benefits of having permanent government
involvement in terrorism insurance).
315. See CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 26–30 (suggesting massive economic
problems to U.S. insurance industry even with a government program).
316. See HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 3; Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241,
at 4 (noting that if the government does not convince the private sector that it
will not provide any bailouts in the case of another attack, the nation may
have to intervene).
317. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 16.
318. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103.
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The common reason why property owners do not purchase
terrorism insurance is due to high premiums. At this time,
owners have no incentive aside from the protection of extra coverage to purchase terrorism insurance.319 TRIA does not provide
the purchasers of terrorism insurance any incentives.320 Meanwhile, insurers have the main incentive of reinsurance backing
through the nation’s federal government.321 Consumers, however, primarily face external incentives from their lenders.322
For example, many lenders now require terrorism insurance for
large commercial buildings and new large-scale construction
projects.323 The problem then remains, for example, in the case
of properties that already have mortgages, as it is highly
unlikely that lenders will aggressively file loan defaults for the
failing owners to purchase terrorism insurance, since many
have not done so already.324
The Israeli system and the U.K. government’s insurance intervention in Northern Ireland provide some insight as to how
the U.S. government can make use of the American tax system
319. See Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 5 (asserting that the Federal government could make the purchase of terrorism insurance coverage
mandatory, which would in turn enhance the insurance industry’s ability to
force purchasers into taking greater security measures). See also Gollier,
supra note 14, at 10 (noting that the enforcement of a policy in support of risk
prevention alleviates the disparities that ex ante moral hazard situations
create); Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 2 (explaining the economic
theory of “negative externality” in terms of national security relating to terrorism). Terrorist attacks undermine a nation’s sovereignty in the same manner
as an invasion and as a result the costs of such an attack “extend well beyond
the immediate areas and people affected,” imposing costs on the entire nation.
Id. For this reason, private markets and individuals “undertake less investment in security than would be socially desirable” in order to reach satisfactory profit levels. See id. Therefore, government intervention must bridge the
security level discrepancy. Id.
320. For example, the question of whether borrowers can impute their purchase of terrorism insurance to their loan principal still remains unclear. See
Block & Steiner, supra note 276, at 5. For cases that dealt with this issue
before TRIA’s enactment, see Four Times Square Associates, L.L.C. v. Cigna
Investments, Inc., No. 107745/02 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002, rev’d, 2003 N.Y. App.
Div. Lexis 6170 (1st Dep.), and Philadelphia Plaza Phase II v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass’n, 2002 WL 1472337 (Pa. CCP 2002).
321. See U.S. Office of Public Affairs, TRIA Announcement, supra note 245.
322. See Block & Steiner, supra note 276.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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in order to encourage terrorism insurance coverage. The U.S.
probably would not benefit from a social security type system
similar to that available in Israel because Israel’s constant
property damage requires more intense government involvement in the protection of property and citizenry.325 The U.S. can
learn a lesson, however, from the Israeli and U.K. government
insurance systems in order to implement its own incentives to
help induce property owners into purchasing terrorism insurance.326 In particular, the U.S. can create incentives for consumers of terrorism insurance by incorporating some changes to
current U.S. tax laws that would work parallel to TRIA.
Offering tax incentives to property owners for terrorism coverage would help induce property owners to obtain terrorism
insurance coverage in addition to property and casualty insurance.327 U.S. tax law currently allows for the deduction of business and property losses for damaged property.328 As insurance
325. See Sommer, supra note 218, at 359.
326. However, insurance specialists note that even social insurance systems
can face the same problems that trouble the private insurance industry,
meaning that purely public “solidarity systems” may also face the problems of
adverse selection, fraud, and moral hazard. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 16.
327. Terrance Chorvat & Elizabeth Chorvat, Income Tax as Implicit Insurance Against Losses From Terrorism, 36 IND. L. REV. 425, 426 (arguing that by
“forcing the government to provide insurance for its failures, the tax system
can overcome potential public choice problems….[as] without additional behavioral incentives, individuals will not behave in a socially optimal way with
respect to protection from terrorist attacks”); Orszag & Pechman, supra note
241, at 5. See also LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 13 (explaining
how governmental budget considerations can incorporate public protection
and government insurance subsidies). Cf. Heal & Kunreuther, supra note
268, at 13 (suggesting the direct taxation of airline companies in order to encourage heightened baggage security); Martin F. Grace et al., The Demand for
Homeowners Insurance with Bundled Catastrophe Coverage, (Paper prepared
for the Wharton Project on Managing and Financing Extreme Risks, April 4,
2001) (examining the role of government incentives on inducing consumers to
purchase insurance coverage for natural perils), available at http://www.aria.
org/rts/proceedings/2000/homeowners.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
328. IRC § 162 (2000) (enumerating trade and business losses that fall under the category of a legitimate loss for tax deduction purposes); IRC § 165
(2000) (allowing for deduction of losses occurring within the taxable year). An
example can help illustrate how U.S. tax laws work with respect to the deductibility of losses:
[A]ssume A has a business and the total assets of the business are
worth $100,000 at the beginning of the year, including a $10,000
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premiums represent the expected value of loss,329 the U.S. tax
system could provide the public with an incentive to purchase
terrorism insurance by allowing for the deduction of such insurance premiums in the same manner that the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code would calculate a loss, and such recoveries
should be exempt from income.330
Incorporating such a tax incentive in support of terrorism insurance will also require the U.S. government to incorporate
such tax estimates into the nation’s overall budget, which will
encourage decision-makers to incorporate the potential risks of
terrorism and evaluate their resources in a manner that best
works to prevent future terrorist attacks in the U.S.331 The Israeli governmental insurance system requires the nation to include its insurance claims in the government budget, and this
self awareness places the issue of national protection at the
forefront of their political process.332 The U.S. can similarly take
terrorism insurance into account in a manner that would simultaneously limit its financial exposure of having to pay the cost
of another terrorist attack.
2. The Public/Private Terrorism Insurance Dichotomy and
All It Can Offer
Even though a nation can arguably bear the burden of solely
assuming the financial costs of insuring against terrorism, bear-

computer. If the computer is destroyed and has to be replaced, A has
suffered a $10,000 loss and the net value of assets of the business is
$90,000. Because there has been a net decrease to wealth, A’s taxable income is reduced by $10,000. Hence, the amount of income tax
A owes will be reduced by $10,000 multiplied by the tax rate.
Chorvat & Chorvat, supra note 327, at 429 (exploring U.S. income tax rule
incentives in certain basic situations).
329. Insurance policies should charge an insurance premium that is equal to
the cost of the potential loss multiplied by the risk of loss. Id. at 430.
330. Id. Such a tax scheme is justified as no “net change in wealth” has
occurred. Id. In other words, a person who receives an insurance payment
that is equal to their loss does not earn anything additional. Instead, insurance payments simply reinstate the property owner at the same state as before the loss had occurred. Therefore, tax deductibles should not apply in
situations where insurance payments “over-compensate” an insured for their
losses. Id.
331. Id. at 443.
332. See generally Sommer, supra note 218.
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ing the entire risk alone would prove to be highly inefficient.333
If the U.S. government took on the role of insurance carriers,
the responsibility would also include risk management and
documentation, which have proven to be extremely time consuming and expensive in the wake of September 11.334 TRIA
and Pool Re similarly sidestep this problem by establishing
public/private insurance schemes that seem beneficial for a
smoother implementation of terrorism coverage, private industry re-development, and national security.335 Both insurance
programs have many things in common, but they also have important differences that highlight areas where TRIA needs
some improvement.336
Both TRIA and Pool Re work to keep the insurance industry
involved in the coverage of terrorist attacks. The insurance industry’s assumption of the risks of others requires that the industry also provide incentives for risk management through a
lowering of premiums.337 Although governments can establish
reimbursement incentives, such programs do not prove entirely
beneficial, as studies have shown that consumers do not take
full advantage of such opportunities.338 The insurance industry’s involvement in terrorism coverage, however, serves to
force property owners seeking terrorism insurance to assume
increased responsibility for ensuring safety and satisfying the
333. See HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 3 (explaining that the federal government’s size and sovereign power provide it with the ability to provide insurance in a way that the private sector could not).
334. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 7. See also Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Initial Risk Insurance Program; Initial Claims Procedures, 68
Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67101 (Dec. 1, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50) (explaining how the insurance the insurance industry is currently processing and
administering claims).
335. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103;
U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 8. See also LAKDAWALLA &
ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 13 (arguing that even with mechanisms of public
protection in place, government insurance subsidies prove to be the optimal
approach in increasing terrorism protection).
336. See Finding a TRIA Replacement, INS. DAY, Dec. 12, 2003, available at
LEXIS, Nexis News & Bus. Library.
337. See THOMAS VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, STATE INTERVENTION ON THE
MARKET FOR NATURAL DAMAGE INSURANCE IN EUROPE 16 (CESifo, Working
Paper No. 1067, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a
bstract_id=464601 (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
338. See Woo, supra note 20.
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requirements of their lenders.339 TRIA and Pool Re keep the
insurance industry intact, and in this way these programs allow
for private intervention in terrorism risk mitigation.
Furthermore, TRIA and Pool Re take advantage of the insurance industry’s capability to process detailed documentation
regarding specific properties’ insurance needs and potential requirements.340 The risk management actions that the private
sector offers entail any of the following: building design, structure evaluations, safety equipment, evacuation plans, exit
strategies, and heightened security systems for trophy properties — insurers then underscore each action with a reduced
principle.341 By maintaining private sector involvement, both
programs allow insurers to keep checks on protection measures.342 The private sector’s involvement, therefore, helps ensure that adequate measures protect insured properties from
terrorist calamity.343 TRIA and Pool Re’s implementation allow
the insurance industry to set higher standards for the mitigation of potential damages caused by terrorism.

339. See Block & Steiner, supra note 276, at 5.
340. The insurance industry provides data on insured losses through reports
known as “bordereau” to their reinsurers, and TRIA makes use of this practice
by requiring insurance companies to maintain and create such records for the
federal program, which in turn keeps this insurance industry practice intact
for a later time when the government will cease to regulate terrorism insurance. See Department of Treasury, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67100, 67102–3
(Feb. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50).
341. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 6–7 (explaining that a “profit
maximizing firm will invest in risk mitigation up to the point where the marginal costs of additional mitigation is equal to the marginal cost of insuring
against that risk”). Two categories of risk mitigation exist: (1) investments
that help protect existing buildings from terrorist attack (such as enhanced
security, strengthening structural supports, shatter proof windows, and improved air vents, etc.); and (2) influence on new building construction, which
includes development considerations such as building size, location, architectural design, etc. Id.
342. See Jason B. Lee, Restructuring Building Design Against Terrorism,
RISK MGMT., Nov. 2002, available at http://rmmag.com/MGTemplate.cfm?Secti
on=RMMagazine&NavMenuID=128&tem (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
343. However, insurance companies’ incentives to mitigate terrorist risks
may also influence developers to avoid constructing high profile buildings or
projects. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 7. See also HILLMAN, supra
note 55, at 15 (arguing that the insuring of any risk should also incorporate
the private insurance industry).
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TRIA undisputedly resembles the British Pool Re system, but
it differs in many respects as Pool Re has had significant time
to mature as a mutual reinsurance program and the U.K. as a
nation has thirty years of experience in facing the issue of terrorism.344 Pool Re has been covering the U.K.’s terrorism insurance program for eleven years and has gained a substantial
amount of monetary leverage and experience.345 Similar to the
U.S., Pool Re’s fate as a government terrorism insurance system
was questionable,346 but over the years the program has expanded in a manner that allows it to adapt to current terrorism
concerns.347 Accordingly, the U.S. can learn from Pool Re’s experience. The U.S. can specifically take note of the U.K.’s Pool
Re approach in expanding coverage, defining terrorism, establishing premium requirements, and allowing for the review of
Pool Re’s decisions.
Pool Re has proven successful in providing the nation’s terrorism reinsurance needs, and, for this reason, the program has
expanded to cover terrorism-related perils that at one time were
covered by neither the insurance industry nor the governmental
program.348 Unlike the U.S., where many states require fire
coverage, the U.K. initially did not include this type of damage
in the terrorism insurance package offered by Pool Re.349 As the
U.K. program has gained adequate capital in its reserves, Parliament decided that it would expand its Pool Re program to
cover more terrorist-related risks after September 11.350 The
U.K. now provides coverage for nuclear disaster, flood, etc.351
The U.S. Terrorist Insurance Program falls short of such cover344. See U.K. Cabinet Office, The United Kingdom and the Campaign
Against International Terrorism, Sept. 9, 2002, at 12, at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/sept11/coi-0809.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
345. See TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.
346. In Pool Re’s earlier stages, many insurance specialists expressed serious concerns and reservations regarding the government program. See, e.g.,
Fleming, supra note 214.
347. See generally U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165.
348. See generally TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168. But see, e.g., Andrew Bolger, Norwich Union Stresses Stance on War Cover, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2003, at 4, available at 2003 WL 3429735 (noting that certain insurers in the
U.K. are not willing to provide expansive terrorism insurance coverage).
349. See U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 5.
350. See id. at 1.
351. Id. See also U.K. Cabinet Office, supra note 344, at 14.
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age, allowing for claims arising from more conventional methods of terrorist attacks.352 As many commentators argue that
terrorists probably will strike in a manner that has not been
accounted for,353 traditional forms of terrorism may be changing.354 Accordingly, if the U.S. government allows for TRIA’s
survival, the legislation will also have to include different varieties of terrorist risk; otherwise its coverage may realistically
prove minimal and it may spark litigation in the future.355
The U.K. has also accounted for the changing nature of terrorism as it has broadened the nation’s definition of terrorism
overall.356 A terrorist attack in the U.K. includes domestic terrorist groups of all types.357 The definition of a terrorist occurrence in the U.K. focuses on the effects of such an attack and
the intent of such action on the nation.358 The U.S., on the other
352. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103.
353. See, e.g., PANEL DISCUSSION, COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES ROUNDTABLE, IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND INVESTMENT JANUARY
13, 2003 (Gale Group, Inc., 2003) (At this roundtable discussion, Joe Franzetti, director of Salomon Smith Barney, emphasized that insurers are currently concerned about bio-terrorism, whereby terrorist could potentially tamper with a building’s HVAC system, which insurers believe could be accomplished more easily than more truck bombings, etc.); Ruth Gastel, Computer
Security-Related Insurance Issues, INS. INFO. INST., Sept. 2003, available at
LEXIS, Nexis News & Bus. Library (listing “cyber terrorism” as a new issue
for first and third party insurance coverage). See generally Thomas, supra
note 43, at 413–17 (taking into account the different transaction costs involved in insurance litigation of matters that fall in categories beyond the
scope of “traditional terrorism,” i.e., bombings, political hostage-taking and
airplane hijacking).
354. See id. See also Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 11 (explaining
that enhanced security is essential for preventing terrorist uses of chemical
and biological plants in their plans of mass destruction); U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 2 (noting that terrorist can find ways to go
beyond expected or typical scenarios).
355. See Lobel, supra note 260, at 39 (noting that nuclear, biological and
chemical terrorism-caused losses are not presently included in property coverage and that if an attack is labeled as a terrorist act, then it remains unclear
whether such exclusionary clauses will remain enforceable if terrorism is
found to be the proximate cause of an attack).
356. See Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, ch. 18, § 2(2) (Eng.).
But see Terror Threat to Insurance Cover, BIRMINGHAM POST, Feb. 13, 2003, at
22, available at 2003 WL 15602566.
357. Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, ch. 18, § 2(2) (Eng.)
358. Id. In fact, as a result of the U.K. government’s decision to expand the
definition of terrorism, insurers have also made the similar changes in their
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hand, restricts the definition of terrorism359 to attacks by malicious foreign groups.360 This important distinction reflects how
each nation also views the problem of terrorism. The U.K.’s
definition holds a terrorist act to be any act that goes against
the Crown and the U.K.;361 however, the U.S. approach plainly
focuses on terrorist organizations with roots from abroad without realizing that the problem could just as well be a domestic
one.362 Plainly, terrorist groups do not need to be cultivated
abroad; terrorism may also be “homegrown.”363 The U.S.’ limited
legislative definition of terrorism also poses practical problems
for the insurance companies that provide terrorism coverage
because TRIA’s definition limits the scope of coverage364 to exclude circumstances where wider coverage is necessary.365
own policies. See, e.g., RSA Goes Solo on Terrorism, POST MAG., May 15, 2003,
at 2, available at 2003 WL 8531267; RISK Report — Preparing for Combat,
POST MAG., Feb. 13, 2003, at 36, available at 2003 WL 8530503.
359. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
102(1)(A)(iv).
360. TRIA defines terrorism as an act “committed by an individual or individuals acting on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an
effort to coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the
policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion.” Id.
361. Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, ch. 18, § 2(2) (Eng.).
362. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103. See
also TRIA Department Announces Proposed Regulation Implementing Claims
Procedures Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, U.S. OFFICE OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, Nov. 25, 2003, JS-1022 (quoting Treasury Assistant Secretary for
Financial Institutions, Wayne Abernathy, who notes that TRIA protects the
U.S. economy from “international terrorism”), at http://www.treas.gov/pres
s/releases/js1022.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
363. Suarez & Abrams, supra note 242 (reflecting on the Oklahoma City
bombing example). TRIA also gives deference to the U.S. Secretary of Treasury to decide whether a U.S. citizen who sympathizes with a foreign interest
falls under TRIA’s definition of a terrorist. Id. See also Epstein & Keyes,
supra note 254, at 3.
364. For example, a terrorist act stemming from war could potentially be
excluded from TRIA’s terrorism definition. Michael Bradford, Terrorism Coverage Poses Challenges, Opportunities; CPU Society 2003 Annual Meeting,
BUS. INS., Nov. 17, 2003, at 24H (contemplating the exception that would arise
had Congress officially declared a war on Iraq and a terrorist attack took
place in support of Iraqi interests). However, the U.S. Secretary of Treasury
asserts that the war exclusion only applies to “acts of terrorism committed in
connection with a formal, congressionally declared war” and not pursuant to
military actions connected to the President’s role as the nation’s commanderin-chief. Letter from John W. Snow, U.S. Secretary of Treasury, to Michael G.
Oxley, Chairman of Department of Treasury’s Committee of Financial Ser-
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In contrast to the U.K.’s expansive definition of terrorism and
coverage exposure, Pool Re initially set specific premiums for all
its participating insurance members,366 and continues to implement a “no adverse selection” principle.367 Pool Re no longer
mandates specific premium prices for the insurance industry’s
terrorism insurance packages; however, this change arrived
long after Pool Re had established its own substantial financial
reserves.368 The program also clearly demarcates the maximum
monetary amount for which the insurance industry would be
responsible with regard to terrorist events that occur in one
year, which allows insurers to calculate their potential losses in
advance.369 In addition, regardless of the U.K.’s current premium deregulation, Pool Re members and the U.K. Treasury
Department are still in the process of negotiating the program’s
financial issues, such as premium rates and membership participation thresholds.370 Pool Re also allows for insurance companies to adjust the premium rates that they charge if their
clients take certain “prescribed risk management” steps.371 In
vices (May 19, 2003), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domesticfinance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
However, Mr. Snow also concludes this letter noting that the “letter is not
meant to interpret or provide any opinion as to…privately negotiated limitations and exclusions” found in private insurance contracts. Id. See also Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 133, 41252 (July. 11, 2003)
(to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50).
365. Staring, supra note 306, at para. 5 (noting that the requirement of
having two separate policies will especially hold true in the case of marine
insurance policies, which tend to require broader international insurance
coverage). See also Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
297, § 106(a)(2)(A).
366. Note that Pool Re no longer regulates the insurance industry’s premiums. See U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 4. However, the
U.K. Treasury and Pool Re members will continue to discuss Pool Re’s finance
issues, which undoubtedly include the adjustment of premiums. Id. at 7.
367. Atkins, supra note 156; TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.
Participating insurers must specifically refer to Pool Re’s rate manual for
premium prices. Id. Insurers then must cede this premium amount to Pool
Re. Id.
368. See Premiums Set to Increase After Changes at Pool Re Terrorism Insurance Pricing is Set to Rise Again, LLOYD’S LIST INT’L, Jan. 2, 2003, available
at 2003 WL 3047367; TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.
369. See id. U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 7.
370. U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 7.
371. TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.
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contrast, TRIA allows insurers to charge premiums based on
their own ability to cover terrorist harm, and as a result, many
insurers use this option as a legal loophole to circumvent providing terrorism insurance.372 TRIA technically requires all insurers to make terrorism insurance “available” to their clients,
but the U.S. Treasury confirmed to many apprehensive insurance companies that this requirement would not also stipulate
that rates be reasonable.373 However, insurers still feel uncomfortable with TRIA’s lack of specificity in that the Act covers
amounts that surpass the aggregate threshold amount, but the
statute and program have not indicated how the program will
approach the number of occurrences issue the nation faced with
September 11. For this reason, insurers’ ability to plan their
own financial exposure is limited.374
372. See Michael Prince, Insurers Frustrate Serio on Terror Law; State Insurance Superintendent Blames Coverage Failure on Industry, CRAIN’S N.Y.
BUS., Mar. 24, 2003, at 23 (reporting the details of an interview with Gregory
Serio, New York State Department of Insurance’s superintendent, who noted
that TRIA requires insurers to provide terrorism insurance coverage, but at
the same time insurers have reacted by increasing their terror insurance
premiums by 600% or by requesting approval for “broad-based terrorism exclusions”). Insurers, who manage to circumvent potential buyers of their terrorism insurance, can then apply under TRIA for the reinstatement of their
terrorism risk exclusions. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107–297, § 105(c). See also Epstein & Keyes, supra note 254, at 3; BROWN ET
AL., supra note 255, at 10 (explaining that underwriters have a limited actuarial basis in calculating “probable maximum loss” for the pricing of terrorism
insurance). However, the U.S. Treasury has indicated that it plans on compiling information on insurers’ insurance premium rates through corporate surveys in order to make this information available to Congress, which signifies
that the U.S. government is overseeing the insurance industry’s actions. See
Warshawsky, supra note 12, at 6, 8. These surveys intend to capture TRIA’s
effect on insurers’ deductibles on a yearly basis until 2005. Id. at 11–21 (providing an overview of TRIA’s surveys). The Treasury Department particularly
seeks to establish the insurance industry’s change in capacity towards insuring terrorism. Id. at 18.
373. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103;
Masters, supra note 117, at 430–31. See also Gollier, supra note 14, at 9, 11
(noting that the prohibition of “discrimination or public information” can artificially increase the premium rate even for low risk agents, which actually
serves to enhance the adverse selection problem, but at the same time a policy
that allows for pricing discrimination balances policyholders’ incentive to invest in “risk reducing activities”).
374. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 133, 41250,
41252 (July. 11, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50) (noting that the
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Nevertheless, the U.K.’s system can place restrictions on Pool
Re insurance members, because it also limits insurers ability to
insure with reinsurers who wish to participate in the government-sponsored program.375 Pool Re does not require insurers to
participate in the program,376 but its participating insurers cannot seek private or additional reinsurance coverage.377 The U.K.
program mandates that all of its participating members supply
their deductibles solely to Pool Re.378 As a result, over the program’s lifetime, these provisions have allowed for Pool Re to
expand its own reserves, decreasing the U.K.’s chances of withdrawing from the nation’s own monetary reserves in the event
of another major terrorist attack on the British mainland.379
The U.S. could potentially apply such restrictions on participation; however, such restrictive provisions interfere with the
government’s intention of keeping the program temporary.380
TRIA seeks to encourage reinsurers to cover terrorism insurance and for this reason the government insurance program
does not limit insurers’ capabilities to work with reinsurance
companies.381 In fact, many insurers of terrorism risk in the
Treasury Department cannot ascertain a time frame requirement that the
Secretary of Treasury can follow in the event of multiple terrorists attacks due
to the “inherent uncertainty” involved in such situations).
375. See Cost of Terrorist Attack Insurance Falls by Half, TIMES (LONDON),
July 31, 2003, available at 2003 WL 62398122 (reporting that a number of
insurers can presently provide customers with competitive rates at lower
rates than Pool Re’s participants, making such insurers especially attractive
to property owners with covering single “prestige” buildings).
376. Id.; Barnes, supra note 142.
377. See Fleming, supra note 214, at 8. Pool Re’s participation restrictions
seem to benefit national insurance companies over international ones. Id.
However, private terrorism insurance coverage outside of Pool Re has also
developed. See Lloyd’s Terrorism Bulletin No. 4, Oct. 24, 2001, at http://www.
millerinsurance.co.uk/Downloads/Terrorism4.doc (last visited Jan. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter Lloyd’s Terrorism Bulletin].
378. TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3. However, private terrorism
insurance coverage outside of Pool Re has also developed. See Lloyd’s Terrorism Bulletin, supra note 377.
379. See TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.
380. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 101.
See also BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 9 (noting the “persistent concern
that long-term government dominance…will mean a loss of the efficiency and
innovation fostered by competition within the private sector.”).
381. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §
103(g)(1).
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U.S. have obtained reinsurance coverage for their government
deductible in the likelihood of another terrorist attack.382 Reinsurers’ reemergence in the realm of U.S. terrorism insurance
coverage is two-fold: first, reinsurers are slowly feeling more
comfortable with providing insurance companies coverage for
the risk of terrorism; second, TRIA provides the insurance industry with a clear cap on its potential losses, which is a sum
that insurers can incorporate in their transactions.383 It remains unclear, however, whether the reinsurance industry
would continue to allow insurers to cede their terrorism risks
without TRIA’s limitations on potential liability. Nevertheless,
Pool Re’s example exemplifies the fact that the U.S. can effectively provide support for terrorism insurance coverage without
forcing all insurers to participate. The U.K.’s governmental
reinsurance model also demonstrates that premium setting
plays a huge role in gaining public clientele at least at such a
program’s initial stages.
Since the formation of TRIA’s coverage guidelines and managerial procedures are still in process, it also remains to be seen
whether any issues may arise due to the lack of judicial review.384 Despite U.K. provisions allowing for judicial review of
Pool Re’s determinations, the authoritative appeal tribunal
originates within the agency itself, potentially undermining the
objectivity of the ultimate rulings. However, at least the U.K.
allows for some sort of review. Although no crisis has seemingly emerged from the U.K.’s limited review possibility, TRIA’s
lack of judicial review may prove to be problematic in the U.S.
as the legislation forecloses any possibility of judicial review.385
382. See Tackling a Burning Issue, supra note 304, at 36.
383. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(e)(2).
384. Masters, supra note 117, at 431.
385. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(e)(5).
Several commentators attempted to thwart TRIA’s intolerance for judicial
review by arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §
554, requires the U.S. Treasury Department to allow for claim determination
appeals, under Section 102(3) of the APA. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 133, 41250 (July 11, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F.
pt. 50). However, the Treasury Department has countered such legal contentions by asserting that the APA’s hearing requirement applies only where a
statute requires a hearing on the record, adding that the Supreme Court also
supports this interpretation, and since TRIA specifically forbids such hearings, the Treasury Department concludes that the APA does not apply. Id.
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Such a restriction reduces the transaction costs tied to litigation, but it ultimately may also sacrifice fairness and insurers’
confidence in the government program.386 Despite TRIA’s rigidity on judicial review,387 the U.S. Department of Treasury currently works closely with the NAIC in order to establish a program geared to assisting the insurance industry’s needs.388
V. CONCLUSION
The question of TRIA’s renewal ultimately lies in who should
potentially bear the costs of a terrorist attack — taxpayers, after the fact, or consumers through a previously established insurance system.389 Undoubtedly, the insurance industry will
argue for the program’s continuance, but the real concern
should be the U.S. economy and the public’s main interest in
the long run. TRIA has assisted in lowering the costs of terrorism insurance coverage, but, in order to give the program its
true force, the legislation needs further tailoring to meet the
current circumstances that the nation faces.
The U.S. must consider offering property owners incentives to
purchase terrorism coverage and fine-tuning TRIA’s regulation
of the insurance industry. Through tax incentives, property
owners will most likely have a greater compulsion to invest in
additional coverage for terrorist-related harm. In addition, the
U.S. should make insurance company participation in the government’s terrorism insurance program discretional, as most
inflated premium rates serve as deliberate means of evading
terrorism coverage. These high premiums then distort the perspective of consumers, deterring the purchase of such insurance
coverage. Incorporating these changes in the government’s exSee also U.S. Lines Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (citing U.S. v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 234–38
(1973)).
386. See generally Thomas, supra note 43. However, insurers do have the
opportunity to request a general interpretation of the statute by written submission to TRIP or through an informal oral hearing. Bragg, supra note 9, at
11.
387. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(e)(5).
388. Id. § 101. See also Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Initial Risk
Insurance Program; Initial Claims Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67100
(Dec. 1, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50).
389. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 17 (explaining that super-terrorism creates an “undiversifiable risk….that must be allocated to…consumers”).
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isting program will help ignite the demand for terrorism insurance cover and may also simultaneously accelerate the insurance and reinsurance industries’ capacity and desire to insure
terrorism on their own. Stronger market forces will help further decrease terrorism insurance premiums, and the larger
consumer base will bring forth larger profits.
As the terrorism insurance market gains its own capacity,390
the U.S. government should also strongly consider expanding
TRIA’s scope and coverage. Since terrorism tactics and techniques evolve with time, insurance coverage should also develop
accordingly. TRIA now offers the reinsurance backing necessary for insurers to cover conventional means of terrorism, but
it stops at conventional methods taken by foreign groups. Instead, U.S. terrorism insurance coverage should expand in order to be prepared for the worst. Furthermore, TRIA’s foreign
based terrorist agendas shifts the focus to problems abroad;
however, such problems can develop from within the nation as
well. Therefore, TRIA has initiated the process of preparing the
insurance industry to insure the risk of terrorism, but the
groundwork for complete terrorism coverage is far from being
complete.
Although TRIA’s scheduled sunset is approaching, the risk of
terrorism remains.391 This lingering risk continues to chill the
nation’s insurance industry from fully embracing terrorism coverage.392 The protection of a nation’s citizenry requires both national security and financial planning.393
390. Schoen, supra note 247 (quoting P.J. Crowley, vice president of the
Insurance Information Institute).
391. “Simple calculations suggest that, despite international counterterrorist action, the risk is currently substantial, as indeed it was before September 11, 2001.” Woo, supra note 20, at 17.
392. But see BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 15 (arguing that one of the
“key features” of the U.S. terrorism risk insurance program is its “defined exit
strategy”).
393. In addition to establishing the right insurance plan for the nation, the
U.S. government also must simultaneously focus on the nation’s defensive
mechanisms in order to prevent a terrorist attack from occurring again in the
U.S. This Note has not emphasized national security mechanisms only because this issue is not within its scope. The issue of U.S. “Homeland Security”
legislation and government security programs require their own legal analysis. However, a nation’s security mechanisms are invaluable to the prevention of terrorism. Any mitigation of terrorist risk would also have a positive
counter-effect on the nation’s insurance industry’s ability to insure property.
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TRIA represents a nation moving forward, overcoming immense
suffering and loss. Hopefully, the U.S. will never have to face
another terrorist attack, but at least the U.S. has taken one important step, as other nations have done in the past, in preparation.
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